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EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE WAR ON TERROR
NORMAN C. BAYt
ABSTRACT

Two important paradigm shifts have occurred in the war on terror.
First, the United States has treated terrorism as a military issue, not a
law enforcement problem. Second, the United States has centralized its
intelligence apparatus under the direction of the newly-created Director
of National Intelligence and lowered the wall that separated external
security orforeign intelligence activity from internalsecurity or domestic law enforcement. In tandem, these changes are of historic dimension.
They also occur against a backdrop in modern times in which the executive branch has steadily accumulatedpower. In pursuit of the war on
terror, we have begun to blur traditionallines meant to protect civil liberty from the danger of excessive executive power: the line between the
military and domestic law enforcement on the one hand, and between
domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence on the other. This
blurring of lines already has led to difficult questions regardingthe limits of executive prerogative and will undoubtedly lead to more. The cumulative effect of both paradigm shifts is to enlarge executive authority
and to increase the risk of civil liberty abuses.
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INTRODUCTION

An examination of post-9/11 governmental action inevitably raises
the question of how to balance civil liberty interests against national security concerns in times of crises. This question is not a new one, either
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for the United States or for any other nation. More than 2000 years ago,
Cicero, the Roman statesman, lawyer, and philosopher, coined the
maxim, "Inter arma silent leges."' (In time of war, the law is silent.)
Then, of course, there is the oft-quoted admonition attributed to Benjamin Franklin, "Those, who would give up essential liberty to purchase a
little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.", 2 Falling
somewhere between Cicero's observation and Franklin's admonition is a
more recent appraisal by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist:
It is neither desirable nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty will
occupy as favored a position in wartime as it does in peacetime. But
it is both desirable and likely that more careful attention will be paid
by the courts to the basis for the government's claims of necessity as
a basis for curtailing civil liberty. The laws will thus not be silent
in
3
time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different voice.
Whether in time of war the law should have no voice, a somewhat
different voice, or the same voice, is a question that not only may profoundly affect individual rights but the constitutional structure of government itself. In measuring the extent of the law's voice during times of
crisis, the focus is often on the impact of national security-related measures on individual rights. 4 But post-9/11 governmental action may also
1.
Cicero, Pro Milone, quoted in QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 863 (1965) (citation
omitted). In recent times, this maxim has been widely cited. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
579 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 224 (1998);
Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 16, 150 (2002); Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L. REv.
767, 767 (2002).
There is, of course, a certain irony in its authorship. After Julius Caesar was murdered,
political turmoil ensued in Rome. See ANTHONY EVERITT, CICERO 272-319 (2001). Cicero sought
to restore the Roman Republic and opposed Marc Antony in a series of speeches in the Senate
known as the Philippics. Id. Antony later came to power with Octavian and Lepidus in the Second
Triumvirate and had Cicero killed, along with Cicero's brother and nephew. Id. At Antony's order,
Cicero's head and hands were cut off and nailed to the rostrum in the Senate. Id.
2.
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759), reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 107
(Jared Sparks ed., Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co. 1836). Different, if not corrupted, versions of this
quote appear on any number of websites. It is not clear if Franklin authored the quote, or if it was
published under his direction and with his approval. Sparks asserts that Franklin "was not in fact the
author [of AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA]
although it was written under his direction, and doubtless from copious materials furnished by him."
Id.
at
108-09.
See
also
Richard
Minsky,
Franklin Quoted by
Minsky,
http://www.futureofthebook.com/stories/storyReader$605 (asserting that "Franklin may well have
composed this particular quote.").
3.
REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 224-25. Not surprisingly, 9/11 has stimulated a considerable
body of scholarship in this area. For a small sampling of recent scholarship, see Bruce Ackerman,
The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004) [hereinafter Ackerman, Emergency Constitution]; David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot, 113
YALE L.J. 1753 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004); Bruce Ackerman, Response, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J.
1871 (2004). See also Lee Epstein, et al., The Supreme CourtDuring Crisis: How War Affects Only
Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to
Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism
at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2004).
4.
A profusion of scholarship has already focused on the impact of post-9/l 1 governmental
action on individual rights. For a sampling of such literature, see THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS:
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., 2003);
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affect the distribution of power among the three branches of the federal
government, as well as the distribution of power between the federal

government and the states. Those structural consequences implicate, in
the aggregate and over the long term, liberty concerns that may be more
subtle and difficult to discern, though no less important. Moreover, any
examination of separation of powers issues raised by post-9/11 govern-

mental action must be placed in its historical context, against a backdrop
in modem times of the steady accumulation of power in the executive
branch.
This article asserts that two paradigm shifts have occurred as a result of the government's war on terror6 and that each implicates structural

DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS (2003); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE
CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2002).

5.
For an examination of this point, see Mark Tushnet, ControllingExecutive Power in the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673 (2005); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianismand Executive Unilateralism: An InstitutionalApproach to Rights During Wartime, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME:

BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 161

(Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); Lobel, supranote 1.
6.
For purposes of this article, the term "war on terror" is used to describe the government's
post-9/l I efforts to combat terrorism. Left unexplored is whether the "war on terror" is a true war.
A number of scholars have argued that it is not. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC
CONSTITUTION:

AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 247 (2004) ("It is debat-

able, of course, whether the war on terrorism is really a war at all."); PHILIP B. HEYMANN,
TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 21 (2003) (on policy grounds
rejecting the metaphor of "war" as "dangerous in the longer run"); Jordan J. Paust, Post 9/11 Overreactions and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, JudicialReview of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1335, 1340-43 (2004) (arguing that as a matter of international law, the U.S. cannot be at war
with al Qaeda); Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28
YALE J. INT'L L. 325, 326-28 (2003) (same); Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 135, 140 (2004) ("Although using the language of war and describing the September 1Ph attacks as war crimes may be a convenient rhetorical device to describe
the struggle to cripple international terrorist organizations, it is not consonant with existing and
well-established principles of international law.").
Other scholars have argued the contrary. See RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING
SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 186 (2005) ("In wartime the
interest in security soars and so civil liberties are diminished; and our current struggle with international terrorism is, like the Cold War, plausibly described as war."); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2070
(2005) ("When, as here, both political branches have treated a conflict as a 'war,' and that characterization is plausible, there is no basis for the courts to second-guess that determination based on
some metaphysical conception of the true meaning of war."); Eric A. Posner, Terrorism and the
Laws of War, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 423, 424 (2005) (arguing that "[t]he laws of war might sensibly be
applied to conflicts between states and international terrorist organizations, though most likely in a
highly modified form"); John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists,44 VA. J. INT'L L.
207, 213 (2003) (asserting that conflict with al Qaeda qualifies as war and that it does not make sense
to treat 9/11 "as a massive crime, rather than an act of war").
For a thoughtful and provocative critique of both positions, see Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks,
War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of
Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004). Professor Brooks argues that the law of armed conflict
provides "no clear guidance" for determining whether al Qaeda is a criminal enterprise or a belligerent armed force. Id. at 718.
[T]he Bush administration's arguments for viewing the September 11 attacks as 'armed
conflict' are-from a legal perspective-at least as persuasive as the arguments for viewing
the September 11 attacks as crimes .... There is no longer any basis for asserting a
clearly discernable line between crime and conflict.
Id See also Ackerman, Emergency Constitution, supra note 3, at 1032 ("Our legal tradition provides us with two fundamental concepts-war and crime-to deal with our present predicament.
Neither fits.").
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constitutional issues. The first shift has been to militarize the United
States' response to terrorism. In general, prior to 9/11, the United States
dealt with terrorism through the criminal justice system. After 9/11, the
United States began to treat terrorism as a military issue. One manifestation of this paradigm shift has been the indefinite detention of citizens as
enemy combatants. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,7 the Supreme Court rejected
the broadest assertion of an unreviewable executive power to detain.8
There is now some guidance on the outer limits of executive power in the
war on terror, at least with respect to the detention of citizens by the military. Nevertheless, Hamdi hardly represents a sweeping vindication of
civil rights, and, indeed, may be viewed as an affirmation of executive
branch power. Moreover, many questions remain unanswered in the
wake of Hamdi, and the military response to terrorism will continue to
pose difficult line drawing questions on the bounds of executive prerogative in matters once primarily handled through the courts and by civilian
authorities.
The second paradigm shift has involved a centralization of foreign
and domestic intelligence activities under the newly created National
Intelligence Directorate. This centralization, which was authorized by
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 9 lowers
the proverbial wall between foreign intelligence gathering and domestic
law enforcement-a wall carefully erected and maintained for more than
half a century by the National Security Act of 1947.10 In addition, various provisions of the Patriot Act dismantle the wall between foreign and
domestic intelligence. 1 Unlike the issue of citizen enemy combatants,
we have no guidance from the Supreme Court on the centralization of
intelligence functions, and, for reasons to be explained, are unlikely to
receive any. In both instances, however, post-9/11 governmental action
raises important structural constitutional issues. And in both instances, a
recurring theme is the accumulation of power in the executive branch.
In tandem, the paradigm shifts are of historic dimension, and should
Important and long-standing lines have been
not pass unobserved.
blurred between the military and domestic law enforcement on the one
Some in the Bush administration, but not the President, appear to be questioning the use
of the phrase "war on terror." General Richard B. Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
recently said that he had "objected to the use of the term 'war on terrorism' before, because if you
call it a war, then you think of people in uniform as being the solution." Richard W. Stevenson,
President Makes It Clear; Phrase Is 'War on Terror',N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at A12. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other officials had also used the phrase "global struggle against
violent extremism." Id. President Bush, however, rejected that formulation and has continued to
call the conflict a war. Id.
7. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
8.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535.
9.
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1011,
118 Stat. 3638 (2004) [hereinafter IRTPA].
10. National Security Act of 1947 § 103(d)(1), 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3(d)(1) (West 2003).
11.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
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hand, and between domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence on
the other-lines that were drawn to protect civil liberty from the danger
of excessive executive power. While some scholarship has noted the
military response to terrorism, 2 and other scholarship has commented on
recent laws that have centralized intelligence functions and lowered the
wall between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement, 13 this
article comments on both changes, places them in a historical context,
and evaluates their cumulative impact and the way in which they enlarge
executive authority.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief explanation of the theory underlying the separation of powers doctrine and a
framework for analyzing separation of powers claims involving the executive branch. Part II places an assessment of executive power in a
historical context and discusses its growth in modem times. Some powers are less obvious than others and were not contemplated by the Framers. Part III examines the paradigm shifts that have occurred as a result
of the government's war on terror: a militarized response to terrorism
and a centralization of intelligence functions. Not surprisingly, perhaps,
this article concludes that one result of the war on terror has been to expand the power of the executive branch, an expansion that is part of a
broader and problematic historical trend.
I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The Framers imposed structural limits on the power of government
in order to better secure liberty. Part of the limitation occurs on a vertical plane; part occurs on a horizontal plane. On the vertical plane, the
Constitution establishes a political structure in which there is a federal
government and state governments. Within that structure, there are lim12.
For examples of such scholarship, see HEYMANN, supra note 6, at 19-33, 91-98; Robert
M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-SupportLaws and the Demands of Prevention, 42
HARV. J.ON LEGIS. 1, 34-39 (2005); John S. Baker, Jr., Competing Paradigmsof Constitutional
Power in "The War on Terrorism, " 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 5 (2005); Richard H.
Kohn, Using the Military at Home: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 165 (2003);
Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 307 (2003); Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1217 (2002).
13.
For scholarship that discusses the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 and its creation of a Director of National Intelligence, see POSNER, supra note 6; Grant T.
Harris, Note, The CIA Mandate and the War on Terror, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 529 (2005). To
date, there has been far more scholarship on provisions of the Patriot Act that dismantle the wall
between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement, see COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 4, at
162-65; STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN:
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11 43-48 (2002); Richard Henry
Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The PatriotAct and the Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and
Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 319 (2005); Lobel, supra note 1,at 787-90; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Under a Watchful Eye: Incursions on PersonalPrivacy, in THE WAR ON OUR
FREEDOMS, supra note 4, at 133-43; Peter P. Swire, The System of ForeignIntelligence Surveillance
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306 (2004); Nola K. Breglio, Note, Leaving FISA Behind: The Need
to Return to Warrantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113 YALE L.J. 179 (2003); George P.
Varghese, Comment, A Sense of Purpose: The Role of Law Enforcement in Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 385 (2003).
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its on the power of each government. The federal government is a government of enumerated powers. 14 It can act only if the Constitution allows it to do so. Moreover, under the Tenth Amendment, "[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
'5
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.'
The States, then, serve as a counterweight to the federal government.
On the horizontal plane, the federal government is divided into three
branches: the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Implicit in
that division is a separation of powers among the three branches. The
purpose of the separation is to establish an internal system of checks and
16
balances that prevents any one branch from becoming overly powerful.
As James Madison explained in The Federalist,No. 51, "the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department consists in giving to those who administer each department
the necessary constitutional
means and personal motives to resist en17
croachment of the others.,
In combination, Madison wrote, the vertical and horizontal distribution of power was intended to check the exercise of arbitrary power and
to safeguard civil liberty:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will controul
each other; at the same
18
time that each will be controulled by itself.
Thus, as Justice Brandeis later elaborated, the doctrine of separation of
powers was not intended to promote efficiency, "but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power."' 9 "The purpose was not to avoid friction, but,
by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the gov-

14. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote:
This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. The principle,
that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too apparent, to have required to be enforced by all those arguments, which its enlightened friends, while it was
depending before the people, found it necessary to urge; that principle is now universally
admitted.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
15.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
16. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683. 706-07 (1974).
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 318-19 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
18.
Id. at 320. See also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 87 (15th ed. 2004) ("To the drafters of 1787, protection against excessive concentrations of
power lay less in explicit limits such as the 'shall nots' of the Bill of Rights than in diffusions of
power among a variety of governmental units.").
19. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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ernmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from
20
autocracy.
The branches of government, however, are not hermetically sealed
from each other. "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dis-

persed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.'
Congress enacts legislation,22 for example, but the President wields the veto

power.23 In the area of foreign affairs, the President has the power to

make treaties and to appoint ambassadors, subject to the advice and con-

sent of the Senate.2 4 With respect to military affairs, the President is the
Commander-in-Chief,25 but Congress has the power to declare war, to
raise and support the armed forces, and to make rules regulating the
armed forces.26

Whether one branch has overstepped its constitutional bounds and
violated the separation of powers doctrine raises difficult and nuanced
questions of constitutional law.27 For claims of executive branch overreaching, the most influential and widely cited test comes from Justice
Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.28 In
20. Myers, 272 U.S. at 293. For recent scholarship that questions the extent to which the
principle of separation of powers protects civil liberties, see Tushnet, supra note 5, at 2677.
21.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
23. Id.at art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
24. Id.at art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
25. Id.
at art. II, §2, cl. 1.
26. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl.11-14.
27. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore in greater detail the varying analytical
approaches to separation of powers questions. Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court has relied on
two tests, one known as "formalism" and the other as "functionalism." See generally FALLON, supra
note 6, 174-77; Rebecca L. Brown, SeparatedPowers and OrderedLiberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook, Formalism,Functionalism,Ignorance,Judges, 22 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 11 (1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr., RelationshipsBetween Formalism andFunctionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 21 (1998); Burt Neubome, Formalism, Functionalism, and the Separationof Powers, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45 (1998); Peter L.
Strauss, Formal and FunctionalApproaches to Separation-of-PowersQuestions - A FoolishInconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488 (1987).
28.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-60 (Jackson, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has noted
that Justice Jackson's analytical framework "brings together as much combination of analysis and
common sense as there is in this area." Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981). See
also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 2050 (calling Justice Jackson's categorization of presidential power "widely accepted"); Epstein, et al., supra note 3, at 110 (based on quantitative analysis
of Supreme Court precedent arguing that in war-related cases, the Court uses an "institutional process" approach that "looks towards Congress"); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 5, at 194 (noting that
"where both legislature and executive endorse a particular tradeoff of liberty and security, the courts
have accepted that judgment"); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt:
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1274 (2002) (describing Justice Jackson's analytical framework as creating "three now-canonical categories that guide modem analysis of separation of powers"); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 82 (noting that Justice Jackson's concurrence "explored
in some detail the central importance of a grant of authority from Congress"). An interesting critique of Justice Jackson's test is that "[b]y emphasizing fluid constitutional arrangements between
Congress and President instead of the fixed liberal dichotomies bounding executive power, the legal
realist approach to the Constitution and foreign affairs has effectively supported the extension of
executive emergency authority." Lobel, supra note 1, at 775.
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Youngstown, President Truman seized the nation's steel mills to avert a
strike during the Korean War.29 In doing so, he relied upon his power
under Article II of the Constitution, including his authority as the Commander-in-Chief. 30 The steel companies challenged Truman's action,
alleging a violation of separation of powers. 3' The Supreme Court
agreed.32 In his concurrence, Justice Jackson explained that executive
action could be divided into three zones of analysis.33
In the first zone, the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization from Congress. 34 In such a situation, the President's authority is at a maximum for it includes all of his constitutional power
plus all that Congress can delegate. 35 "If his act is held unconstitutional
under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government
as an undivided whole lacks power., 36 Presidential action in this category is "supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the37burden of persuasion would rest
heavily upon any who might attack it."

In the second zone, the President acts in the face of congressional
silence.38 Congress has neither granted nor denied authorization.3 9 In
this situation, Justice Jackson explained, the President can rely only upon
his own independent power.40 There is a "zone of twilight," however, in
which the President and Congress may have concurrent authority or in
which the distribution of authority is uncertain.4 1 "Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference, or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a
practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. ' 2 Evaluating the constitutionality of executive action
in such circumstances "is likely to depend on the imperatives of events
and 4contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
3
law."
In the third zone, the President acts contrary to express or implied
congressional intent. 44 In this situation, the President's "power is at its
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter., 45 To sus29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
Id.
Id.at 583-84.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id.at 636.
Id. at 636-37.
Id.
Id.at 637.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tain executive action, courts must essentially reject Congress's authority
to act upon the subject. 46 This cannot be done lightly.

"Presidential

claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by
our constitutional system.A7
As a matter of constitutional theory, the excessive concentration of
power in one branch of government can have serious consequences.
First, on a horizontal plane, an undue concentration of power in one
branch of the federal government throws off the checks and balances

inherent in a system of separated powers. An imbalance of power may
occur. To paraphrase Madison, the ambition of one branch may no
longer be able to counteract the ambition of another. 48 Moreover, on a
vertical plane, to the extent that this growth of power in one branch of
government results in an enlarged federal authority, it may also affect the
distribution of power between the federal government and the states.49 In
other words, the theory underlying the constitutional structure-that the
horizontal and vertical distribution of power will result in a "double security" 50 to safeguard the rights of the people-may be called into question.
II. GROWTH OF EXECUTIVE POWER
An examination of separation of powers issues raised by post-9/11
governmental conduct cannot occur in a vacuum. It is widely accepted

that executive power enlarges in time of crisis, whether that crisis is
caused by civil war, economic collapse, or international armed conflict. 5'
Beyond that, executive power must be viewed from a historical perspective. Madison believed that in a representative republic, Congress, not
46. Id. at 637-38.
47. Id.
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 17, at 319.
49. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine federalism issues implicated by the war on
terror. Suffice it to say that some have already arisen and more are likely to come. As an example,
in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Attorney General John Ashcroft asked local police to assist the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in interviewing 5000 young Middle Eastern men nationwide. Fox
Butterfield, A Nation Challenged- The Interviews; A Police Force Rebuffs F.B.I. on Querying
Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at B7. The police in Portland, Oregon, refused to assist
federal agents based on racial profiling concerns. Id. Similarly, the REAL ID Act of 2005 establishes uniform standards for state driver's licenses and requires states to verify that a license applicant is lawfully present in the U.S. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202, 119 Stat. 311,
312-15 (2005). The nation's governors have predicted that the law will impose an enormous burden
upon the states. Michael Janofsky, Governors Warn of High Costs Arisingfrom New ID Law, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2005, at A18.
See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating federal law on 10th Amendment grounds that "commandeered" state officials, by requiring
them to perform background checks on prospective gun buyers).
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 17, at 320.
51.
See generallyREHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 224 ("Quite apart from the added authority that
the law itself may give the President in time of war, presidents may act in ways that push their legal
authority to its outer limits, if not beyond."); Gross, supra note 3, at 1029 ("When an extreme exigency arises it almost invariably leads to the strengthening of the executive branch not only at the
expense of the other two branches, but also at the expense of individual rights, liberties, and freedoms."); Lobel, supra note 1, at 770 ("[s]ince September 11, there has been a dramatic, and in some
respects unprecedented, expansion of Executive power").
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the Presidency, would be the most powerful branch: "it is against the
enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge
all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions. 5 2 Nevertheless, in
modem times, the Supreme Court, Congress, and scholars alike have
observed the steady accumulation of power in the executive branch since
the founding of the Republic.53
At the outset, one must acknowledge the President's formidable
powers under Article II of the Constitution. The executive power of the
United States is vested in the President.5 4 The President has the consti55
tutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.,
Among other powers, the President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces,5 6 receives and appoints ambassadors,5 7 and makes treaties with
the advice and consent of the Senate. 58 The President is sworn to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution., 59 Thus, the President is
with great power in the area of foreign affairs and national secuvested
6
rity.

0

But, as Justice Jackson famously observed more than half a century
ago, the modem President has powers not apparent from the text of the
Constitution. 61 A "gap ... exists between the President's paper powers
and his real powers. The Constitution does not disclose the measure of
52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 306 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
53.
See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., FINAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, Book 1, 10 (1976) [hereinafter 1 CHURCH FINAL REP.] ("[T]he executive

branch generally and the President in particular have become paramount within the federal system,
primarily through the retention of powers accrued during the emergency of World War ll.");
FALLON, supra note 6, at 173 ("Over the sweep of American history, power has almost steadily
flowed to the President."); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT:

POWER INVESTED,

PROMISE UNFULFILLED 1-7 (1985) (describing growth of executive power); Sunstein, supra note 3,
at 68-69 ("Undoubtedly the increasing power of the President is largely a product of functional
considerations having to do with the rise of the United States as an international power and the
growing need for energy and dispatch."); Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the
Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 731 (2005) (noting "the radical expansion of presidential power during the post-World War II era").
54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
55. Id. § 3.
56. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
57. Id. § 2, cl. 2 & § 3.
58. Id. § 2, cl. 2.
59. Id. § 1, cl. 7.
60. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("In this vast
external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems, the President alone
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."). See generally JOHN E. NOWAK
& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 240 (7th ed. 2004) ("Thus, by constitutional exe-

gesis, practical experience, and Congressional acquiescence, the executive has usually predominated
the foreign affairs sphere, but this expansive international relations power is not plenary, nor may it
be exercised contrary to restrictions in the Constitution such as the Bill of Rights."); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 638 (3d ed. 2000) ("these constitutional provisions have
come to be regarded as explicit textual manifestations of the inherent presidential power to administer, if not necessarily to formulate in any autonomous sense, the foreign policy of the United
States"); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 66, 69 (recognizing that the President has "considerable power"
with respect to national security, but calling it "tendentious to contend that when the nation is at risk,
the President must be in charge of the apparatus of government.").
61.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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the actual controls wielded by the modem presidential office. 62 The
President commands the public's attention in a way no other political
figure can. Modem methods of communication, including radio and
television, have only served to expand the President's ability to shape
public opinion. Justice Jackson explained:
Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a single head
in whose choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of
public hopes and expectations. In drama, magnitude and finality his
decisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the
public eye and ear. No other personality in public life can begin to
compete with him in access to the public mind through modem
methods of communications. By his prestige as head of state and his
influence upon public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those who
are supposed to check
and balance his power which often cancels
63
their effectiveness.
Moreover, the modem President is not only the head of government,
but the head of a political party as well. According to Justice Jackson,
the "rise of the party system has made a significant extraconstitutional
supplement to real executive power." 64 The Framers associated political
65
parties with "factions" that often acted contrary to the public interest,
and no political parties were present at the Constitutional Convention in
1787.66 Yet, for the modem President, "[p]arty loyalties and interests,
sometimes more binding than law, extend his effective control into
branches of government other than his own and he often may win, as a
political leader, what he cannot command under the Constitution., 67 The
President, for example, usually commands the loyalty of legislators from
his own party. This, of course, means that if his party controls Congress,
he will often be able to get his way, and, as a practical matter, Congress's
check on his power reduced.6 8
Furthermore, "[v]ast accretions of federal power, eroded from that
reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential activity."'69 Modem American history has seen the rise of the regulatory state
and administrative agencies with delegated lawmaking powers.7 y In the
62. Id.
63.
Id. at 653-54.
64. Id. at 654.
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 71 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Among the
numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately
developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.").
66. FALLON, supra note 6, at 5.
67.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring).
68. Tushnet, supra note 5, at 2679 ("The separation-of-powers mechanism weakened with
the advent of political parties that linked national officials, especially the President, to the local
political coalitions that selected candidates for Congress.").
69.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring).
70. See Federal Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 755 (2002)
("The Framers, who envisioned a limited Federal Government, could not have anticipated the vast
growth of the administrative state."); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 544
n. 10 (1985) ("Most of the Federal Government's current regulatory activity originated less than 50
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last century, federal laws have created new departments and a myriad of
agencies.71 Congress has delegated rulemaking authority to those agencies, which are often executive, not independent, in nature. The President has the appointment power with respect to executive agencies and
establishes their policy as well. Rules promulgated by the agencies extend the reach of executive power, and an agency's construction of statutes within its jurisdiction to administer is given deference under the
Chevron doctrine. 72 "If a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing
agency's construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to
In combination,
accept the agency's construction of the statute . . . .
of modem
aspect
every
virtually
into
reach
administrative agencies
American life.
More than the rise of the modem regulatory state, in the last few
sharply. 74
decades the number of federal criminal laws has increased
Federal criminal laws now reach into areas once thought to be "local
crimes," which were the traditional province of the states. Examples include drug trafficking,75 loan sharking,76 domestic violence,77 and the
unlawful possession of firearms. 78 Under certain circumstances, the government can also detain individuals not charged with a crime. Material
witnesses in a criminal matter may be detained "if it is shown that it may
become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subyears ago with the New Deal, and a good portion of it has developed within the past two decades.");
FALLON, supra note 6, at 178-79; LOWI, supra note 53, at 52-58.
71.

See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 30-35 (3d

ed. 1999).
See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699
72.
(2005).
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2699.
73.
74. There were few federal crimes prior to the Civil War; today, there are more than 3,000.
Sara Sun Beale, FederalizingCrime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 40-44 (1996). The American Bar Association's Task Force on the
Federalization of Criminal Law has reported that "of all federal criminal provisions enacted since the
ABA TASK FORCE ON
Civil War [1865], over forty percent [were] created since 1970."
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1998).

Chief

Justice Rehnquist has warned that the trend to federalize crimes traditionally handled by the states
threatens to overwhelm the federal courts. The 1998 Year-End Report of the FederalJudiciary,THE
THIRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 1999, at 3,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov//ttb/jan99ttb/januaryl999.html. See also Kathleen F. Brickey,
Criminal Mischief: The Federalizationof American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1172
(1995) (noting that Congress has "placed federal criminal law on an evolutionary collision course
with state criminal law."); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized
Crime: Advantages of FederalProsecution,46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1125 (1995) ("For all practical
purposes, most crime has been 'federalized' for some time, and the recent additions to the federal
criminal code are merely the latest in a long trend. Whether desirable or not, the federalization of
the substantive criminal law is largely an accomplished fact."); Sanford H. Kadish, Comment, The
Folly Over Federalization,46 HASTINGS L.J. 1247, 1248 (1995) ("[R]ecent years have witnessed a
considerable expansion of federal authority, particularly in the last decade, with the increasing effect
of turning traditional state offenses into federal ones, raising some serious cause for concern.").
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-971 (West 1999 & West
75.
Supp.2005).
76.
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 891-96 (West 2000) (extortionate credit transactions).
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-66 (West 2000 & West Supp. 2005) (domestic violence and stalk77.
ing).
78.
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-30 (West 2000 & West Supp. 2005) (firearms); 26 U.S.C.A. §§
5801-72 (West 2002) (machine guns, destructive devices, and certain other firearms).
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poena. ' '7 9 Similarly, under a provision of the Patriot Act, with reasonable
cause, the government can detain an alien suspected of being a terrorist
for up to seven days and then for renewable periods of up to six months
"if the release of the alien will threaten the national security of the

United States or the safety of the community or any person." 80 Under
Article II of the Constitution, it is the duty of the President to enforce
those laws.8 1 This, too, expands the scope of executive discretion.

That discretion, in turn, permeates each step of the criminal justice
process: from the interpretation of statutes, to the investigation and
prosecution of crimes, and the granting of pardons if a conviction obtains.

The Attorney General, for example, has the implicit power to

interpret federal criminal statutes in such a way so as to all but preclude
prosecution. First, his interpretation of statutes will be accorded conclu-

sive weight by federal prosecutors in the Department of Justice.82 Moreover, the interpretation, even if erroneous, will likely establish a mistake
of law defense by any individual who reasonably relies upon it. 83 Simi79.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3144 (West 2000). Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties
Union have criticized the Bush administration's use of this law to detain terror suspects not charged
with a crime. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WITNESS TO
ABUSE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER THE MATERIAL WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11

(2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0605/; Eric Lichtblau, Two Groups ChargeAbuse
of Witness Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A10. For an explanation of the material witness
statute, see Roberto lraolo, Terrorism, GrandJuries, and the FederalMaterial Witness Statute, 34
ST. MARY'S L.J. 401 (2003). For a critique of the government's use of the material witness statute to
detain individuals in the absence of criminal charges, see Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely,
Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/l1 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims
in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609,
685-87 (2005) (critiquing government's use of material witness statute to detain an individual for
alleged terrorist ties); Laurie L. Levenson, Detention, Material Witnesses & the War on Terrorism,
35 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1221 (2002) ("The War on Terrorism also has made a fundamental
change in the use of material witness laws. Under the material witness laws, individuals who have
not committed any crime themselves may nonetheless be detained for extended periods of time.");
Karen C. Tumlin, Comment, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173, 1211-13 (2004) (same). For scholarship that questions the utility of
material witness detention in cases involving "sleeper" terrorists, see Chesney, supra note 12, at 3438 (noting that detention under the material witness statute is "quite temporary" and "not a longterm solution to the problem posed by potential sleepers").
80. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 350-52 (2001). For scholarship
that critiques the effect of 9/11 on immigration law, see Raquel Aldana, The September11 Immigration Detentions and UnconstitutionalExecutive Legislation,29 S.ILL. U. L.J. 5, 5 (2005) ("[federal
immigration] agencies, in fact, replaced standard immigration procedures with a law enforcement
process intended to incapacitate those arrested for as long as possible while they are investigated
and interrogated, with immigration enforcement merely as a secondary goal."); Akram & Karmely,
supra note 79, at 645 (post-9/1 I government policies "have exacerbated a trend toward criminalizing immigration law, expanding the categories of mandatory detainees, reducing administrative
discretion in determining release, and curtailing the immigration and federal courts from review of
detention decisions."); Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law: An Inside
Perspective, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 349, 351 (2005) (arguing that "the post-September 11th
immigration reforms .. .followed the radical Republican modus operandi of leveraging national
security and terrorism to implement an anti-immigrant agenda"); Tumlin, supra note 79, at 1177
("U.S. terrorism policy is profoundly reshaping our national immigration and immigrant policy.").
81.
U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 3.
82.
See, e.g., infra note 83.
83.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (mistake of law defense when an individual "acts in
reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or
erroneous, contained in ... an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law
with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the
offense."). A recent example of the President's power to define criminal statutes narrowly occurred
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larly, if investigators choose not to investigate an alleged criminal violation, or if prosecutors decline to bring charges, those decisions are all but
unreviewable on
separation of powers grounds as an exercise of execu84
tive discretion.
Even if an individual is investigated, prosecuted, and convicted of a
federal crime, the President may issue a pardon. 85 There is ample precedent for such pardons in cases involving national security. In 1988, the
86
Independent Counsel charged 14 individuals in the Iran-Contra Affair.
Eleven were convicted, but two convictions were overturned on appeal.8 7
One case was dismissed after the Attorney General refused to declassify
documents ruled relevant to the defense.88 On Christmas Eve, 1992,
shortly before leaving office, President George H. W. Bush pardoned the
former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and five other government officials. 89 Two of the individuals, including Weinberger, were
awaiting trial at the time of the pardon.90 In pardoning those individuals,
President Bush characterized the prosecution as representing "the criminalization of policy differences," 9' a characterization rejected by the Independent Counsel.9 2

when the Department of Justice advised that the federal torture statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340A (2005),
required a showing of specific intent to inflict severe pain or suffering - "the infliction of such pain
must be the defendant's precise objective" - and defined torture, in part, as pain "equivalent in
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of
bodily function, or even death." Memorandum from the U.S. Department of Justice to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Regarding Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 2340-2340A 1, 3, 13 (Aug. 1, 2002), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee
801021tr.html. As a practical matter, this interpretation made it difficult to establish the elements of
the offense by creating a high threshold for "torture" and a restrictive mens rea standard. Even if
allegedly torturous conduct were prosecuted, the wrongdoer would likely assert reasonable reliance
on an official interpretation of law. The Department of Justice subsequently retracted its August
2002 Memorandum. See Memorandum from the U.S. Department of Justice to James B. Comey,
Deputy Attorney General, Regarding Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 23402340A 2 (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf.
84. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (recognizing broad prosecutorial discretion because prosecutors "are designated by statute as the President's delegates to help him
discharge his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."')
(quoting U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("'[S]o long as
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion."') (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978)); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 837,
837-38 (2004) ("Few decisions prosecutors make are subject to legal restraints or judicial review.").
85. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl.I (President has the "Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offenses against the United States").
86.
LAWRENCE E. WALSH, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, 2 FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS 1-3 (Aug. 4, 1993) [hereinafter 2 FINAL REP. OF THE INDEP.
COUNSEL].

87. Id.at 1-2.
88. Id. at 2-3.
89. Proclamation No. 6518, Grant of Executive Clemency, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (Dec. 24,
1992) [hereinafter Proclamation No. 6518].
90.

2 FINAL REP. OF THE INDEP. COUNSEL, supra note 86, at 2.

91.
Proclamation No. 6518, supra note 89.
92. LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS 82 (Feb. 8, 1993), reprinted in 2 FINAL REP. OF THE INDEP. COUNSEL, supra note 86, at 666.
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As a historical matter, executive power also increased after World
War II. In response to the Cold War, the government, for the first time in
American history, founded a permanent and powerful peacetime military
establishment to which a substantial portion of the nation's budget was
devoted. 93 In 1940, the United States spent an amount equal to 1.7 percent of its gross domestic product on national defense. 94 Military spending rose dramatically during World War II and subsided in the demobilization that followed. 95 With the start of the Cold War, however, defense
spending once again began to rise. From 1952 to 1959, it was at least ten
percent of gross domestic product each year. 96 By 1961, three days before leaving office, President Eisenhower observed that "[o]ur military
organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime" and warned of the rise of "the military industrial
complex., 97 "This conjunction of an immense military establishment
and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. '98
Just as important as the development of a powerful peacetime military establishment, the Cold War also witnessed the creation of standing
agencies devoted to the collection and analysis of intelligence. 99 In this
regard, the work of the Church Committee is instructive. The Church
Committee, named after the Senator who chaired it, was asked in the
wake of Watergate to investigate allegations of wrongdoing committed
by U.S. intelligence agencies. 0 0 According to the Church Committee,
before World War II, the U.S. intelligence effort was ad hoc and sporadic.10'
After World War II, however, Congress created agencies that
institutionalized the collection of intelligence.10 2 "The significant new
facets of the post-war system are the great size, technological capacity
and bureaucratic momentum of the intelligence apparatus, and, more
93.
MICHAEL J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 264 (1998) ("The nation had established a permanent peacetime military establishment for the first time in its history and the armed forces enjoyed an unparalleled
degree of autonomy.").
94.
2005 PRESIDENT'S ECON. REP. 304, availableat http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/
17fed20051700/www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2005/B79.xs.
See also Robert Higgs, U.S. Military
Spending in the Cold War Era: Opportunity Costs, Foreign Crises, and Domestic Constraints,
CATO POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 114 11 (Nov. 30, 1988), available at http://www.cato.org/cgibin/scripts/printtech.cgi/pubs/pas/paI 14.html.
95.
See 2005 PRESIDENT'S ECON. REP., supra note 94, at 304; Higgs, supra note 94, at 11.
96.
Id.
97.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Military-Industrial Complex Speech 3 (1961), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/speeches/eisenhowerOO .htm.
98.
Id. From 1948 to 1986, military purchases averaged about $162 billion a year, or 7.6
percent of gross national product. Higgs, supra note 94, at 11. Prior to World War II and the Cold
War, peacetime spending on defense was generally no more than 1 percent of gross national product.

Id.
99.
1 CHURCH FINAL REP., supra note 53, at 10.
100.
Douglas Jehl, Judging Intelligence: The Report; Senators Assail C.I.A. 's Judgments on
Iraq'sArms as Deeply Flawed, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A 1.
101.
Id.; AmY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC
163-84 (1999).
102. Themes Karalis, Foreign Policy and Separation of Powers Jurisprudence: Executive
OrdersRegardingExport AdministrativeAct Extension of Times of Lapse as a PoliticalQuestion, 12
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 109, 121 (2004).
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importantly, the public's acceptance of the necessity for a substantial
permanent intelligence system."' 1 3 This development was "alien to the
previous American experience."' 04
The power, influence, and importance of the intelligence agencies,
in turn, enhance executive power. The intelligence community consists
10 6
10 5
of fifteen different agencies with an estimated budget of $44 billion.
While the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is an independent agency,
its Director is appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation. 107 The remaining fourteen agencies are all located within the executive branch.10 8 The National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence
Agency, for example, are part of the Department of Defense; similarly,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is a component of the Department of Justice.' 0 9 The Church Committee concluded that "[t]he intelligence agencies are generally responsible directly to the President and
because of their capabilities and because they have often operated out of
the spotlight, and often
in secret, they have also contributed to the growth
' 10
of executive power.""
Technological changes also occurred that amplified the agencies'
ability to gather information. As a result, they possessed greater power
to monitor the lives of citizens than in the past. According to the Church
Committee, in the decades following World War II, "unparalleled" technological advances had occurred."' Those advances "markedly increased the agencies' intelligence collection capabilities, a circumstance
which has greatly enlarged the potential for abuses of personal liberties. ' 12 In the decades since the Church Committee issued its report,
technological advances have only increased the government's ability to
watch over the lives of its citizens.'
Those advances will likely con-

103.

1 CHURCH FINAL REP., supra note 53, at 9-10.

104.
105.

Id.at 10.

COMM'N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 579 (2005) [hereinafter
WMD COMM'N REP.]. Appendix C to the Report contains a useful "primer" on the intelligence
community. Id.at 579-89. See also NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 86-87 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMM'N REP.]; POSNER,

supranote 6, at 43-44 (describing agencies within the intelligence community).
106.
Scott Shane, Official Reveals Budgetfor US. Intelligence Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2005, at A24. Earlier estimates pegged the intelligence budget at $40 billion. See POSNER, supra
note 6, at 129; Douglas Jehl, Disclosing Intelligence Budgets Might Be Easiest of 9/11 Panel's
Recommendations, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2004, at A15.
107.
50 U.S.C.A. § 403-4a(a) (West 2005).
108.
WMD COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 580.
109.
Id. For an overview of the NSA, see Michael V. Hayden, Balancing Security and Liberty:
The Challenge of SharingForeign Signals Intelligence, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
247 (2005).
110.
1 CHURCH FINAL REP., supra note 53, at 10.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Justice Brandeis once warned that:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not
likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the Gov-
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tinue. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently noted the "power of technol1' 14
ogy to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy."
The development of institutions devoted entirely to national security
also led to the need to classify their work. This, too, is an important
though subtle power that the President possesses. Under federal law, the
executive branch has broad latitude to decide if a document contains
classified material.' 15 Once classified, it is a federal crime to mishandle
or to disclose the information in an unauthorized fashion." 6 The classified status of a document renders it all but impervious to a request for
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, which explicitly excludes classified information from its ambit.' 17 Once classified, it is often a laborious process for information to be de-classified, and courts
will often defer to executive8 claims that national security requires the
non-disclosure of material.'

eminent, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and
...expose... the most intimate occurrences of the home.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
different types of electronic surveillance, see Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The
Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1350-56
(2002) (providing examples of "new technologies... likely to erode privacy even further"); Ronald
D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond the "War" on Terrorism: Towards the New Intelligence Network, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1446, 1465-72 (2005) (discussing intelligence collection through data
mining); Peter G. Madrinan, Devil in the Details: ConstitutionalProblems Inherent in the Internet
Surveillance Provisions of the USA PATRIOTAct of 2001, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 783, 784-88 (2003)
(arguing that "[sleventy-four years after Justice Brandeis' premonition [in Olmstead], the ambiguities latent in the terms of PATRIOT's pen register and trap devices ... make it possible for the
government to literally 'see' those pages of information an individual has viewed on the Internet
without physically inspecting the personal computer."); Ric Simmons, Technology-Enhanced Surveillance by Law Enforcement Officials, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 711, 712-13 (2005) (describing technology that results in "virtual surveillance," "hyper-intrusive searches," and "high volume
collection."); Daniel J. Solove, ReconstructingElectronic SurveillanceLaw, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1264, 1293 (2004) ("Electronic surveillance law has not kept pace with the staggering growth of
technology.").
114.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). In Kyllo, the Court held that the police
use of a thermal imaging device requires a search warrant. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. The Court took
into account more sophisticated systems already in use or development and noted that "[t]he ability
to 'see' through walls and other opaque barriers is a clear, and scientifically feasible, goal of law
enforcement research and development." Id. at 36 n.3.
115.
See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, A Troubling Equation in Contractsfor Government Funded
Scientific Research: "Sensitive But Unclassified" = Secret But Unconstitutional, I J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'Y 113, 118-23 (2005). For a history of executive orders that established the
classification system, see NATHAN BROOKS, THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1-5 (2004), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21900.pdf, Christina E. Wells,
Information Control in Times of Crisis: The Tools of Repression, 30 OHIO N.U.L.REV. 451, 452-61
(2004).
116.
18 U.S.C.A. § 793(f) (West 2000) (criminalizing gross negligence in the handling of
information relating to the national defense); § 798 (felony to knowingly and willfully disclose
classified information to an unauthorized person).
117.
5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1996 and West Supp. 2005).
118.
See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) ("[l]t is the responsibility of the Director of
Central Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors in
determining whether disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising
the Agency's intelligence-gathering process."); Center for Nat'l Security Studies v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004) (acknowledging deference to executive branch with respect to claims that information must be protected on
national security grounds); Jacobs, supra note 115, at 119-20.
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Thus, the classification power, while essential to protecting national
security, is also susceptible to abuse. 19 In the hands of overly protective
officials, it can be used to shield the executive branch from outside scrutiny. It can also be used to stifle the flow of information so essential in a
democracy, for only an informed electorate is available to hold its leaders
politically accountable. Nor can Congress perform its oversight function
if it is unable to discern the activities of the executive branch. The executive branch itself may become less efficient as excessive secrecy and
the compartmentalization of information prevent agencies from sharing
information and cooperating. 120 Almost thirty years ago, the Church
Committee feared that "a series of secret practices ... have eroded the
processes of open democratic government. Secrecy, even what would be
agreed by reasonable men to be necessary secrecy, has, by a subtle and
barely perceptible accretive process, placed constraints upon the liberties
of the American people." 121
III. Two PARADIGM SHIFTS

The United States' war on terror has involved two paradigm shifts.
The first shift is the treatment of terrorism as a military issue, not as a
law enforcement problem. Following 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan, the Bush administration created a military detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and held two United States citizens without
criminal charges at naval brigs in the United States. One United States
citizen, Yaser Hamdi, was captured on a battlefield in Afghanistan; 122 the
other citizen, Jose Padilla, was seized after stepping off a plane at Chicago's O'Hare Airport. 123 In the case of Hamdi, the Supreme Court has
spoken, and we now have some guidance on this issue. The Court re119. It has been reported that, by several measures, government secrecy has reached an alltime high, "with federal departments classifying documents at the rate of 125 a minute as they create
new categories of semi-secrets bearing vague labels like 'sensitive security information."' Scott
Shane, Sharp Increase in the Number of Documents Classifiedby the Government, N.Y. TIMES, July
3, 2005, at § 1, 14. The record number of documents classified in 2004 - 15.6 million - was nearly
double the number in 2001. Id. For commentary and scholarship critical of the Bush administration's use of its power to restrict the flow of information, see John Podesta, Need to Know: Governing in Secret, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM, supra

note 4, at 226 ("what's troubling about this administration's approach to secrecy is its conversion of
the legitimate desire for operational security into an excuse for sweeping policies that deny public
access to information and public understanding of policymaking"); Jacobs, supra note 115, at 11316 (critique of government's post-9/l 1 decision to prevent disclosure of information described as
"sensitive but unclassified"); Wells, supra note 115, at 493 (concluding that "[t]he Bush administration's actions with respect to secrecy are of great concern."); Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The
Freedom of Information Act Post-9/1 1: Balancing the Public's Right to Know, CriticalInfrastructure Protection,and Homeland Security, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 261, 266 (2003) ("FOIA developments
in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 have created a climate of nondisclosure, and that the 'war
against terrorism' does not justify the magnitude of recent data restrictions imposed by the U.S.
government.").
120.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 417 ("Current security requirements nurture overclassification and excessive compartmentation of information among agencies.").
121.
1 CHURCH FINAL REP., supra note 53, at 9.
122.
Thomas E. Ricks & Jerry Markon, U.S. Nears Deal to Free Enemy Combatant Hamdi;
American Citizen Who Has Been Held Since 2001 Without Being Charged, WASH. POST, Aug. 12,
2004, at A2.
Id.
123.
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jected the broadest assertion of executive prerogative, but the case nevertheless can be viewed as an affirmation of executive power.
The second paradigm shift involves the wall between foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence that had been carefully erected in 1947.
Post-9/1 1, that wall has been lowered through legislation that creates a
Director of National Intelligence and that encourages the sharing of foreign and domestic intelligence, as well as closer cooperation between the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). One shift blurs the line between the military and domestic
law enforcement. The other blurs the line between domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence. Both result in expanded executive
power.
A. MilitaryResponse to Terrorism
The phrase "war on terrorism" is not a new one and was used by
policymakers and Presidents prior to 9/11.124 In 1984, President Reagan
delivered a message to Congress in which he described a "war against
terrorism." 125 The following year, in addressing the American Bar Association, he characterized terrorism as "an act of war."' 126 In May 1995,
President Clinton used the phrase "war against terrorism" in a radio address, and it appeared in the 1996 Democratic Party platform.

127

Simi-

larly, United States' policy has long recognized that terrorism posed a
threat to national security. In 1986, President Reagan signed National
Security Decision Directive 207, "The National Program for Combatting
Terrorism.' ' 128 This document recognized that in some cases terrorism
129
was a law enforcement issue; in others it called for a military response.
In 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 39 that
called terrorism both a matter of national security and a crime. 130 In this
directive, for the first time, policymakers recognized the threat to the
United States from terrorists who acquired weapons of mass destruction. 13'
Nevertheless, before 9/11, the United States largely dealt with terrorists through the criminal justice system. 132 There were, of course,
124.
Robert M. Chesney, Careful Thinking About Counterterrorism Policy, 1 J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'Y 169, 171-77 (2005) (describing history of phrase).
125. Id. at 173.
126.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 99.
127.
Chesney, supra note 124, at 174-75.
128.

STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN

LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001, 140 (2004).
129.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supranote 105, at 113; COLL,supra note 128, at 141.
130.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 101.
131.
COLL, supra note 128, at 318.
132.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 73 ("Legal processes were the primary method for
responding to these early manifestations of a new type of terrorism."); COLL, supra note 128, at 254
("Americans were still much more likely to die from bee stings than from terrorist strikes during the
early 1990s. In that respect it made more sense to treat terrorism as a law enforcement problem.");
Sievert, supra note 12, at 312 ("[W]ith rare exception, before September 11,2001, we had developed
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some notable exceptions. After the bombing of a German nightclub in
1986 that killed and wounded several U.S. soldiers, President Reagan
sent planes to bomb targets in Libya. 133 In 1993, President Clinton
launched a limited strike on Baghdad after learning of an Iraqi plot to kill
former President Bush.' 34 In 1998, in response to the al Qaeda bombings
of United States' embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States
launched cruise missiles against35 targets in the Sudan and Afghanistan
and sought indictments as well.1
In the past, the use of force in response to an international terrorist
attack was an exception, not the rule. For the most part, the United
States responded to such attacks by seeking indictments against the alleged perpetrators. This occurred after the bombing of Pan Am Flight
103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988,136 the shooting of five
CIA employees in their cars as they were stopped in traffic outside CIA
headquarters in Virginia in January 1993,137 the first World Trade Center
bombing in February 1993,138 the subsequent plot to bomb New York
City landmarks in the summer of 1993,139 the Manila air plot to place
bombs aboard a dozen trans-Pacific U.S. airliners in the winter of
1995,140 the bombing of Khobar Towers in Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia in
the habit of classifying all attacks, regardless of target, as criminal acts of terrorism to be dealt with
by civilian courts under U.S. criminal law."); Note, Responding to Terrorism. Crime, Punishment,
and War, supra note 12, at 1224 ("[T]he United States has traditionally treated terrorism as a
crime.").
133.
BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1016 (2003); George C. Wilson & David
Hoffman, U.S. Warplanes Bomb Targets in Libya as "Self-Defense" Against Terrorism, WASH.
POST, Apr. 18, 1986, at Al. In 1996, German investigators arrested five suspects in the bombings.
Steven Erlanger, 4 Guilty in Fatal 1986 Berlin Disco Bombing Linked to Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2001, at A7. Four were later convicted in Berlin. Id.
134.
CARTER ET AL., supra note 133, at 997; David Von Drehle & R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S.
Strikes Iraqfor Plot to Kill Bush, WASH. POST, June 27, 1993, at Al.
135.
CARTER ET AL., supra note 133, at 1022; Barton Gellman & Dana Priest, U.S. Strikes
Terrorist-LinkedSites in Afghanistan, Factoryin Sudan, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1998, at A1.
136.
A Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands ultimately tried two Libyan defendants. Donald
G. McNeil Jr., The Lockerbie Verdict: The Overview; Libyan Convicted by Scottish Court in '88
Pan Am Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at Al. One was convicted, and the other acquitted. Id
137.
Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57, 59 (Va. 1998). Two of the shooting victims died.
Kasi, 508 S.E.2d at 59. The gunman, later identified as Mir Aimal Kasi, fled to Pakistan, where he
was arrested nearly four-and-a-half years later. Id.He was tried in Virginia state court, convicted,
and sentenced to death. Id. at 59-60; Threats and Responses: An EarlierKilling; Virginia Executes
PakistaniWho Killed 2 at the C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at A20.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 71-73; United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d
138.
Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
933 (2003). The initial indictment in this case charged six individuals: Mohammed A. Salameh,
Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, and Bilal
Alkaisi. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 108. Yousef, Abouhalima, and Yasin fled the United States immediately after the bombing. Id.Abouhalima was caught in Egypt and returned to the U.S. to stand trial.
Id.The first four defendants to stand trial were convicted on a variety of charges and sentenced to
240 years imprisonment each. Id.Yousef was captured in Pakistan in 1995. Id at n.2. Another coconspirator, Eyad Ismoil, was indicted for his involvement in the bombing. Yousef 327 F.3d at 79.
Ismoil was arrested in Jordan two years after the attack. Id.Both were convicted at trial in the Southern District of New York. Id.at 79-80. Yasin remains a fugitive. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 108 n.2.
139. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 71-73; United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d
Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
140. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 73. Ramzi Yousef was the mastermind of this plot.
Yousef 327 F.3d at 78. He, Abdul Hakim Murad, and Wali Khan Amin Shah were charged with
various crimes for their conspiracy to bomb U.S. airliners and convicted at trial. Id.at 79-80.
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June 1996 in which 19 Americans died and 372 were wounded, 14 1 the

August 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania which killed 12
Americans and 212 others, mostly Kenyan, and which wounded thousands, 142 the foiled January 1, 2000 millennium bomb plot, 143 and the
October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Aden, Yemen, which killed 17
sailors and wounded at least 40.144
There were advantages and disadvantages to using the criminal justice system in response to terrorist attacks. 145 The advantages included
an affirmation of important process values. The accused were given the
full panoply of rights attendant to a criminal prosecution in federal court.
This includes the appointment of counsel, a public trial, and the right to
141.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 60. A federal grand jury in the Eastern District of
Virginia returned a 46-count indictment that charged 14 individuals for the bombing. David Johnston, 14 Indicted by U.S. in '96 Saudi Blast; Iran Link Cited, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2001, at A1. No
individuals have been tried for the offense in the United States, but Saudi Arabia has apparently
prosecuted and punished some of them. Saudi Militants Are Sentenced in '96 Bombing, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 2002, at § 1, 10.
142.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 68-70. Although more than a dozen individuals
including Usama bin Laden were charged for the bombings, only a few have stood trial to date.
Benjamin Weiser, A Nation Challenged: The Courts; 4 are Sentenced to Life in Prison in 1998 US.
Embassy Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at Al.
143.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 174-80. Ahned Ressam, who planned to bomb
Los Angeles International Airport, was convicted at trial. Eli Sanders, Judge Delays Terrorist's
Sentencing, HopingforCooperation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2005, at A20.
144.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 190-97. An indictment was returned against two
Yemeni men in May 2003. Eric Lichtblau, Aftereffects: The Cole Bombing, U.S. Indicts 2 Men for
Attack on American Ship in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2003, at A17. Subsequently, a Yemeni
judge sentenced two men to death and four to long prison terms for their involvement in the bombing. Neil MacFarquhar & David Johnston, Death Sentences in Attack on Cole, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2004, at Al.
145.
The debate over the use of force in response to terrorism is not a new one. For examples
of pre-9/l 1 scholarship on the subject, see Mark B. Baker, Terrorismand the Inherent Right of SelfDefense (A Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 25, 48
(1987) ("Article 51 needs to be re-written, or its terms specifically defined so as to allow for the use
of self-defense in response to terrorism."); Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist
Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 539-41 (1999) (critique
of U.S. missile attack on Afghanistan and Sudan); Timothy F. Malloy, Reporter, Military Responses
to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 287, 288-320 (1987) (debate on 1987 use of force
against Libya); Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV.
89, 90 (1989) (critique of international and domestic law that impede the fight against terrorism).
Post-9/ 11, a renewed debate has emerged on the appropriate response to terrorism. In
general, scholars tend to fall into one of two camps. They either emphasize the use of the criminal
justice system or the use of force. For examples of scholars who advocate the use of domestic or
international criminal law, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of InternationalTerrorism: A
Policy-OrientedAssessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 103 (2002) (calling for "an effective international legal regime with enforcement capabilities"); Sadat, supra note 6, at 136 ("by characterizing
the September 11h attacks as acts of war rather than as terrorism or crimes against humanity, the
United States has lost what could have been an extraordinary opportunity to strengthen international
legal norms and combat international terrorism."); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Rogue Regimes and the
Individualizationof InternationalLaw, 36 NEW ENG. L. REv. 815, 819 (2002) ("Over the longer
term, however, the best strategy would bill itself not as a global war but as a global criminal justice
campaign. From this perspective, the 'war against terrorism' is an all-out fight against a particularly
frightening and deadly form of global organized crime.").
Other scholars argue that criminal law is insufficient to address the problem of terrorism
and that military force is necessary. See Sievert, supra note 12, at 352 ("It is now time, in the early
stages of this conflict, to reconsider the philosophy that dominated the last decade and to recognize
that we are not chasing domestic criminals but are fighting a war."); Abraham D. Sofaer, Playing
Games with Terrorists, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 903, 907 (2002) (critiquing use of criminal justice
system to respond to terrorists and arguing that "[w]hen all else fails, force is the essential method of
protection.").
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present a defense, to confront their accusers and to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to a presumption of innocence that could only be
overcome by a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. All of
those procedural and constitutional safeguards reduced the risk of error
and of an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The trials comported, in other
146
words, with principles of basic fairness and fundamental human rights.
There was no question that they upheld the rule of law. This, in turn,
helped preserve the moral legitimacy of the United States, encouraged
cooperation from other nations, and fostered the development of international legal norms against terrorism. 47 More than that, the Department
of Justice's record in major terrorism cases was remarkably
148 successful.
In case after case, the United States obtained convictions.
But there were disadvantages to a criminal prosecution. The process was costly and cumbersome. Assembling the evidence to present the
case in federal court and to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was
no small task. It involved the work of teams of FBI agents and federal
prosecutors. The process was resource intensive, and this imposed opportunity costs. 149 Law enforcement resources devoted to one matter
were unavailable for others. Treating the scene of a terrorist attack as a
crime scene meant that potential evidence had to be carefully collected
and handled. 150 In many cases, the perpetrators were not in the United
States but overseas. Trying to locate them could take years of painstaking effort.' 51 Then they had to be apprehended and extradited to the
United States. Some perpetrators, including Usama bin Laden, hid in

146.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 9 & 10, 999
U.N.T.S. 17 1; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, arts. 9 - 11, U.N. G.A. Res.
217.
147.
See generally COLE, supra note 4, at 9-10 (noting critical importance of legitimacy at the
international level in order to gain cooperation from other nations); HEYMANN, supra note 6, at 95
(arguing that use of military commissions "deprives the United States of its historic claim of moral
leadership among the world's nations in matters of fairness to individuals charged with a crime,"
"makes even more difficult future efforts at military coalition-building and will deny us the benefits
of legal cooperation with our closest allies in the forms of extradition and mutual legal assistance,"
and "will leave lasting doubts about the honesty of convictions in the wake of secret trials with
secret evidence"); Bassiouni, supra note 145, at 103 ("If we want to put an end to the forms of
violence that we call terrorism, then we need an effective international legal regime with enforcement capabilities that can, as Aristotle once said, apply the same law in Athens as in Rome."); Lobel,
supra note 145, at 555 (asserting that use of military force in response to terrorism is "suspect" and
that "[m]any experts note that these attacks do not deter terrorism, but result in an escalation of
terrorist violence and a spiraling cycle of retaliation."); Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War
on Terror, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 4 (2004) ("Put simply, using war rules when law-enforcement rules
could reasonably be followed is dangerous."); Sadat, supra note 6, at 148 (contending that the "attacks of September 1 th... presented the world with yet another opportunity to further strengthen
the enforcement of international criminal law norms, and fill the gap in enforcement that has plagued
efforts to control international terrorists.").
148.
See supra notes 137-44. Each of the defendants who stood trial in the U.S. was convicted and sentenced to extremely long periods of incarceration.
149.
Cf Harris, supra note 13, at 560 (discussing opportunity costs when intelligence agencies
respond to discovery requests in criminal cases).
150.
Sievert, supra note 12, at 327-30.
151.
See supra notes 137, 138.
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uncooperative states that refused to extradite. 152 Often 153
times, only the
lower-level operatives were caught, not the masterminds.
International terrorism cases also posed the risk that classified information, sources for classified information, and techniques for obtain154
ing classified information would have to be disclosed to the defense.

A defendant has the ability to seek access to other high-level terrorists
who have been captured and who allegedly possess exculpatory information.1 55 Such access, of course, could disrupt the government's on-going
efforts to question the captured terrorists. The trials themselves, given

the factual complexity of the cases and the number of charges and defendants, often lasted months. 156 Justice was neither swift nor sure, two of
152.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 121-26; COLL, supra note 128 passim; Sofaer,
supra note 145, at 906.
153.
Sofaer, supra note 145, at 906; Craig Whitlock, Terror Probes Find 'the Hands, but Not
the Brains': Attackers Often Caught as MastermindsFlee, WASH. POST, July 11, 2005, at A10.
154.
See generally Stewart A. Baker, Should Spies Be Cops?, 97 FOREIGN POL'Y 36, 44-48
(1994) (describing security issues arising from disclosure); Harris, supra note 13, at 559 ("The evercloser relationship between intelligence and law enforcement poses problems in protecting sources
and methods of intelligence information. Specifically, close cooperation between intelligence and
law enforcement agencies can expose intelligence information to Brady requests in criminal trials.").
The Classified Information Protection Act (CIPA) can help prevent the disclosure of classified
information if the government devises a substitute for the information that "will provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific
classified information." 18 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 6(c)(1) (West 2000). "[Blut the substitute must be just
as good as the original for the defendant's purposes. If it is not, the government must reveal its
secrets or drop the prosecution." Baker, supra at 46. For commentary on CIPA, see A. John Radsan, The Moussaoui Case: The Mess from Minnesota, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1417, 1433-34
(2005) (discussing limits of CIPA); Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1962, 1964-66 (2005) (providing overview of CIPA); Rachel S. Holzer, Note, National Security
Versus Defense Counsel's "Need to Know": An Objective Standardfor Resolving the Tension, 73
FORDHAM L. REv. 1941, 1966 (2005) (arguing that "although CIPA was not originally intended to
favor prosecutors or defendants in any way, the government has gained substantial control over
proceedings involving classified information since its enactment.").
155.
As an example, see United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1670 (2005). Moussaoui sought access to three al Qaeda members captured by the
U.S. who possessed evidence material to his defense. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 456. The government
refused to produce the witnesses, arguing that doing so would interfere its efforts to combat terrorism. Id.at 470. The district court imposed sanctions on the government that the Fourth Circuit later
vacated. Id. at 482. For a critique of Moussaoui,see Roberto Iraolo, Compulsory Process, Separation of Powers, and the ProsecutionofZacarias Moussaoui, 35 U. MEM. L. REv. 15 (2004); Radsan,
supra note 154, at 1447-48; Keith S. Alexander, Note, In the Wake of September llth: The Use of
Military Tribunals to Try Terrorists, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 885, 913-14 (2003).
156.
The trial in the first World Trade Center bombing case lasted six months and involved
over 1,000 exhibits and the testimony of more than 200 witnesses. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 108. The
trial in the "landmarks plot" case lasted almost ten months. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 111. The government had to try the World Trade Center case a second time after Ramzi Yousef was arrested. This
trial lasted almost four months. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 80. Yousef's trial for the Manila airline bomb
plot lasted more than three months. Id. For the trial in the embassy bombings case the government
flew in more than 100 witnesses from six countries. Benjamin Weiser, Going on Trial: U.S. Accusations of a Global Plot; in Embassy Bombings Case, the Specter of a Mastermind, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2001, at § 1, 27. The trial lasted five months. United States v. Bin Laden, No. S7R
98CR1O23KTD, 2005 WL 287404, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7,2005).
Of course, complex criminal litigation is often time and resource intensive, whether the
charges involve securities fraud, organized crime, or other serious charges. The trial of John Gotti,
the "Teflon Don," for example, took ten weeks. Arnold H. Lubasch, Gotti Guilty of Murder and
Racketeering,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1992, at Al. The more recent trial of Bernard Ebbers, the former
chief of WorldCom, on fraud charges, lasted eight weeks. Ken Belson, A Guilty Verdict: The Overview; Ex-Chief of WorldCom Is Found Guilty in $11 Billion Fraud,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at
Al. The first trial of L. Dennis Kozlowski, the former chief executive of Tyco International, lasted
around six months and ended in a mistrial. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Chief and Aide Guilty of Loot-
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the hallmarks
for criminal punishment to have the greatest deterrent ef1 57
fect.
More fundamentally, criminal prosecution is generally reactive, not
proactive, in nature. The prosecutor can act only after a crime has been
committed. Even then, once a crime has been committed, under Department of Justice guidelines, the prosecutor should only seek an indictment
if there is sufficient admissible evidence for a jury to find the accused
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 58 If an indictment has been returned,
the prosecutor must focus on the task at hand--on preparing the case for
trial-not on trying to devise counter-terrorism strategies. Of necessity,
a prosecutor must proceed on a case-by-case, defendant-by-defendant
basis. While law enforcement can disrupt organized crime, it does so
with great difficulty even when the organizations are domestic in nature,
let alone when the organization involves foreign nationals located outside the United States.15 9 The 9/11 Commission concluded:
The law enforcement process is concerned with proving the guilt of
persons apprehended and charged .... The process was meant, by its
nature, to mark for the public the events as finished - case solved,
justice done. It was not designed to ask if the events might be harbingers of worse to come. Nor did it allow for aggregating and analyzing facts to see if they could provide clues to terrorist tactics more
generally - methods of160entry and finance, and mode of operation inside the United States.

ing Millions at Tyco, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at Al. His retrial was almost as long. Id. Richard
Scrushy, the former chief executive of HealthSouth, was acquitted after a six-month trial. Simon
Romero & Kyle Whitmire, Corporate Conduct: The Overview; Former Chief of HealthSouth Acquittedin $2.7 Billion Fraud,N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at A 1.
157.
See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 15 n.12 (3d ed. 2001) ("In
general,... an increase in the likelihood of punishment will deter more effectively than an increase
in the severity of punishment."); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 28-29 (4th ed. 2003) ("It does
seem fair to assume, however, that the deterrent efficacy of punishment varies considerably, depending upon a number of factors .... The magnitude of the threatened punishment is clearly a factor,
but perhaps not as important a consideration as the probability of discovery and punishment.").
158. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.220 (Aug. 2002) ("both as a
matter of fundamental fairness and in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prosecution should be initiated against any person unless the government believes that the person probably will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact.").
159.
Despite more than half a century of law enforcement effort, organized crime is here to
stay. See Brian Goodwin, Note, Civil Versus Criminal Rico and the "Eradication"of La Cosa
Nostra, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 279,326-33 (2002) (discussing difficulty of
eradicating La Cosa Nostra). Indeed, new groups have emerged in the United States, including
groups with ties to Russia, Asia, Mexico, and Latin and South America. Dorean Marguerite Koenig,
The Criminal Justice System Facing the Challenge of Organized Crime, 44 WAYNE L. REv. 1351,
1354 (1998). See also Joseph E. Ritch, Comment, They'll Make You an Offer You Can'tRefuse: A
Comparative Analysis of InternationalOrganized Crime, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 569, 571
(2002).
160. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 73.
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Indeed, the 9/11 Commission theorized that the government's very success in terrorism prosecutions "contributed to widespread underestimation of the threat."''6

One can also question on policy grounds whether the criminal justice system provides an adequate response to terrorism on the magnitude
of that committed by al Qaeda against the United States.

In February

1998, Usama bin Laden, declared war against the United States and issued a fatwa in which he urged all Muslims to murder U.S. citizens
wherever they could be found. 162 "We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian," he declared.1 63 "As far as we are concerned,
they are all targets."' 64 His followers are dedicated jihadists, who are
willing to sacrifice their lives in furtherance of his cause.165 The threat of
criminal prosecution may hold little deterrent effect for such an individual. Unlike other criminal organizations, al Qaeda also has a political
agenda. 166 In pursuit of that agenda, al Qaeda has deliberately targeted
civilians and embassies. It has also tried to acquire or make weapons of
mass destruction for at least the past ten years.' 67 From that perspective,
a strict reliance on the criminal justice system appears to be inadequate68
incongruous even-given the demonstrated severity of the threat. 1

Perhaps for all those reasons and more, post-9/11 the Bush administration shifted from the criminal justice model to a military response to
terrorism.' 69 Al Qaeda was at war with the United States, 70 and the

161.
Id. See also Sofaer, supra note 145, at 904 ("[T]he anti-terrorism policy of the Bush and
Clinton administrations, based principally on criminal prosecution, created the misleading impression that the U.S. government was providing the American people with meaningful protection.").
162.

9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 47.

163. Id.
164.
Id.
165.
Milt Bearden, The Nation: Twists of Terror; You Cut the Head, But the Body Still Moves,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, § 4, at 1.
166.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105 at 47.
167.
WMD COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 267.
168.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 363-64 (finding that long-term success against
terrorism "demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense");
William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authorityfor NationalSecurity Surveillance, 50 AM.
U. L. REV. 1, 93 (2001) ("While arrest, prosecution, and incarceration serve well to help prevent
most crimes...

, the risk of ...

terrorist attacks forces us to consider other means of prevention.

Moreover, traditional Fourth Amendment requirements may thwart many investigations of terrorism,
which depend on stealth to prevent terrorist plans before they are carried out.").
169.
To a remarkable extent, the issue of how to respond to terrorism has become politicized in
the United States. A recent controversy arose when Karl Rove, a senior White House adviser, stated,
"Conservatives saw the savagery of 9/11 in the attacks and prepared for war; liberals saw the savagery of the 9/11 attacks and wanted to prepare indictments and offer therapy and understanding for
our attackers." Patrick D. Healy, Rove Criticizes Liberals on 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at
A13. See also Ackerman, Emergency Constitution, supra note 3, at 1032 ("The 'war on terrorism'
has paid enormous political dividends for President Bush, but that does not make it a compelling
legal concept."); Stephen J. Schulhofer, No Checks, No Balances. Discarding Bedrock Constitutional Principles, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERORISM 75
(Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., eds. 2003) ("Predictably, [in the wake of 9/11] there has been
overreaction and political grandstanding.").
170.
For scholarship that debates this issue, see supra note 6.
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United States was part of the battleground.17 1 "[T]ransnational terrorists
have blurred the traditional distinction between national security and
international law enforcement."'' 72 In a speech to the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, then-White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales argued:
[T]he brutal attacks of September 11 th - which killed nearly three
thousand people from more than ninety countries - were not only
crimes but acts of war. Since at least that day, the United States has
been at war with al Qaeda. While al Qaeda may not be the traditional
armed force of a single nation state, al Qaeda is clearly a foreign enemy force. It has central direction, training, and financing and has
members in dozens of countries around the world who are committed
to taking up arms against us. It has political goals in mind. Al Qaeda
has attacked not only one of our largest cities, killing thousands of
civilians, but also has attacked our embassies, our warships, and our
government buildings. While different in some respects from traditional conflicts with nation states, our conflict with al Qaeda is
clearly a war.173
Calling the conflict a war had important consequences. One was that "all
instruments of national power" would be used, including military
force. 74 A second involved the treatment of captured terrorists. "To
suggest that an al Qaeda member must be tried in a civilian court because
he happens to be an American citizen-or to suggest that hundreds of
individuals captured in battle in Afghanistan should be extradited, given
lawyers, and tried in civilian courts-is to apply the wrong legal paradigm. The law applicable in this context is the law of war-those con175
ventions and customs that govern armed conflict."'
171.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT 1
(2005)
[hereinafter
STRATEGY
FOR
HOMELAND
DEFENSE],
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/d200O5630homeland.pdf ("Our adversaries consider US
territory an integral part of a global theater of combat."); Appellant's Opening Brief at 17, Padilla v.
Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005) (No. 05-6396) ("In the war against terrorists of global reach, as
the Nation learned all too well on Sept. 11, 2001, the territory of the United States is part of the
battlefield.").
172.
STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, supra note 171, at 23.
173. Alberto R. Gonzales, Remarks at the Meeting of the American Bar Association Standing
Committee
on
Law
and
National
Security
5
(Feb.
24,
2004),
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/20O4/02/gonzales.pdf. See also Chesney, supra note 12, at 22. Similarly, Viet Dinh, a former Assistant Attorney General in the Bush Justice Department, has argued
that:
An enemy activity may be both a violation of the laws of war and of domestic law. The
president may choose to deal with it as law enforcement officer or as commander in
chief. The decision is his, and the commander in chief has a significant function even in
the United States, because AI-Qaeda has made the U.S. a target.
Anthony Lewis, Security and Liberty: Preserving the Values of Freedom, in THE WAR ON OUR
FREEDOMS, supra note 4, at 65.
174.
Gonzales, supra note 173, at 5. The administration's national security strategy states that,
given the danger of weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. will, "if necessary, act preemptively" with
military force against both rogue states and terrorists, "even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy's attack." GEORGE W. BUSH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.

175.

Gonzales, supra note 173, at 5-6.
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Thus, the administration asserted the prerogative to detain both citi-

zens and non-citizens alike as enemy combatants, regardless of where
they were captured. In November 2001, President Bush issued an order

that directed the Secretary of Defense to establish military commissions
17 6
to try non-citizens believed to be terrorists or harborers of terrorists.

No similar order was issued with respect to citizens. Nevertheless, even
citizens captured in the United States as suspected terrorists could be
designated an enemy combatant. 177 Based on the "totality of circumstances," agencies in the executive branch would assess the potential for

criminal prosecution, material witness detention, or enemy combatant
detention. 7 8 This assessment would take into account a number of factors, including whether an individual posed a potential threat or had
value as an intelligence source, whether prosecution would compromise
an intelligence source, and whether
the individual met the legal standard
79
1
status.
combatant
enemy
for

Whether or not a result of its "totality of circumstances" test, the
administration has not been consistent in its treatment of suspected terrorists or captured Taliban. Many have faced criminal charges in federal
court, rather than military detention. John Walker Lindh, a citizen captured in Afghanistan while fighting with the Taliban, 180 Zacariah Moussaoui, a conspirator in the 9/11 plot,' 8' and Richard Reid, the "shoe-icide
bomber," have all been prosecuted federally. 82 Other alleged terrorists
have as well. 183 Yet hundreds of non-citizens at Guantanamo Bay and
two citizens-Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla-were not. Hamdi was

176.
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism §§
2, 4, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). For an analysis of the constitutionality of military commissions, compare Katyal & Tribe, supra note 28, at 1260 (arguing that "the President's Order
establishing military tribunals for the trial of terrorists is flatly unconstitutional."), with Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 2055 (contending that "Congress has authorized the use of military
commissions to try individuals covered by the AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military Force]...
but.., such commissions cannot be used to try individuals who fall outside the scope of the AUMF
unless the President has independent constitutional authority to wage war against such individuals.").
A district court invalidated the commissions, but was then reversed on appeal. See Harndan v.
Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33, 42-43 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted2005 WL 2922488 (Nov. 7, 2005).

177.
Gonzales, supra note 173, at 13.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 13-14. See also Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 171, at 12 n.2 (further
describing the process by which a citizen is designated an enemy combatant as "the culmination of
an extensive deliberative process within the Executive Branch involving several layers of review.").
180. Neil A. Lewis, Traces of Terror: The Captive; Admitting He Fought in Taliban, American Agrees to 20-Year Term, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at Al.
181.
Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Tells CourtHe's Guilty of a TerrorPlot, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2005, at Al.
182.
Pam Belluck, Threats and Responses: The Bomb Plot; Unrepentant Shoe Bomber Is
Given a Life Sentence for Trying to Blow Up Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A 13.
183.
Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism
Charges, WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at AI (reporting that after 9/11 only 39 individuals have been
convicted of crimes related to terrorism or national security).
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captured on a battlefield in Afghanistan; 184 Padilla was detained as he
85
stepped off a plane at Chicago's O'Hare Airport.'
Hamdi and Padilla were held in military facilities, at first incommunicado, without legal counsel. 186 No charges were filed against them,
and they faced the prospect of indefinite detention. 87 The government
opposed the appointment of counsel. 188 When counsel was allowed to
represent them and challenged their detention in separate federal district
court proceedings, the government asserted that the President, acting as
Commander-in-Chief, had the unreviewable constitutional power to detain both individuals. 89 There was, in other words, no place for federal
court review of this executive action-the indefinite detention of citizens-during a time of war. It was, perhaps, the boldest assertion of
executive authority since Truman's seizure of the steel mills more than
half a century earlier.' 90
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,19 1 the Court addressed two questions: (1)
whether the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who are enemy
combatants; 192 and (2) if so, what process is due a citizen who disputes
his enemy-combatant status. 93 On the first question, five JusticesThomas, plus the plurality of O'Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and
194
Breyer-agreed that Hamdi could be detained as an enemy combatant.
Although the government argued that the executive branch possesses
inherent authority to detain enemy combatants under Article II of the
Constitution, neither the plurality nor Justice Thomas reached the question because they found that Congress had authorized Hamdi's detention
through the Authorization for Use of Military Force Resolution
(AUMF). 195 This resolution, passed one week after September 11, 2001,
enabled the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" or "harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international

184.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528 (E.D. Va. 2002).
185.
Neil A. Lewis, Court Gives Bush Right to Detain U.S. Combatant, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2005, at Al.
186.
Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), motion to reconsidergranted,
243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), motion to certify appeal granted, 256 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y.
2003), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated
by 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004).
187.
Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 569; Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
188.
Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 569; Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
189.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
190.
Padilla,352 F.3d at 711.
191.
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
192. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516. For a clear and concise analysis of Hamdi, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Enemy Combatants and Separation of Powers, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 73, 76-78
(2005).
193.

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542.

194.

Id.at 509.

195.

Id.at 510.
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terrorism against the United States."' 96 The plurality reasoned that
"[b]ecause detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield is a
fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of 'necessary
and appropriate force,' Congress has clearly and unmistakably
author' 97
ized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here."'
Four Justices, however, disagreed. For Justices Souter and Ginsburg, the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), precluded Hamdi's
detention. 98 Section 4001 (a) bars detention of a citizen "except pursuant
to an Act of Congress."'

99

Justices Souter and Ginsburg read the law to

require a "clear statement of authorization to detain," and the AUMF, in
their view, failed to provide one.200 Justices Scalia and Stevens, on the
other hand, rested their analysis on the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, which allows Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 01 In
their view, the Constitution required the government to charge Hamdi
with a crime or to release him.2 °2 He could only be detained without
charges if the writ had been suspended. The AUMF was not such a suspension. 203 Therefore, unless the Executive promptly filed charges or
Congress suspended the writ, Hamdi was entitled to be released.2 4
Having decided that the Executive had the authority to detain
Hamdi, the Court then addressed the second issue of how much process
was due Hamdi in challenging his enemy-combatant status.20 5 The government argued for extremely limited habeas review based on "' [r]espect
for separation of powers and the limited institutional capabilities of
courts in matters of military decision-making in connection with an ongoing conflict.' 20 6 The courts would be restricted to investigating only
whether legal authorization existed for the broader detention scheme.20 7
At most, courts should review an enemy-combatant designation under a
196.
Id.at 510 (quoting 115 Stat. 224).
197.
Id. at 519. Thus, under Justice Jackson's analytical framework, the President's authority
was coupled with that of Congress. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1852) (Jackson, J., concurring). Under such circumstances, "his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate." Youngstown, 343
U.S. at 635. For a lively debate on the AUMF and the scope of presidential power, see Bradley &
Goldsmith, supranote 6 at 2050-54; Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV.

L. REV. 2663, 2664-65 (2005); Mark Tushnet, supra note 5, at 2673-77; Ryan Goodman & Derek
Jinks, Replies to CongressionalAuthorization: InternationalLaw, U.S. War Powers, and the Global
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2653, 2653-54 (2005); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Rejoinder: The War on Terrorism: InternationalLaw, Clear Statement Requirements, and

ConstitutionalDesign, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2683,2683-84 (2005).
198. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 541 (Souter J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment)
199.
18 U.S.C.A. § 4001 (West 2005).
200. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in the judgment).
201.
Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. Id.at 554.
203. Id.at 554.
204. Id. at 555.
205. Id.at 524.
206. Id.at 527 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 26, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
(No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020).
207. Id.
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highly deferential "some evidence" standard in which the court would
assume the accuracy of the government's articulated basis for the detention and assess only whether that basis was a legitimate one.2 °8
The Court rejected the government's position based on a balancing
of interests under Mathews v. Eldridge.20 9 A citizen-detainee must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to rebut the government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. 210 The "some evidence" standard was inadequate to satisfy
the requirements of due process. 2 1' To alleviate the burden upon the
government in a time of war, however, the Court allowed the use of
hearsay evidence and a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government's evidence,2 12 and acknowledged that a properly constituted military tribunal might suffice.21 3 Separation of powers principles did not
mandate "a heavily circumscribed role" for the courts. 21 4 "We have long
since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President
when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens. 21 5
In practical terms, with the exception of Justice Thomas, eight of
the nine Justices rejected the broadest claim of executive power-i.e.,
that the President has the all but unreviewable discretion to detain a citizen indefinitely as an enemy combatant.216 Four Justices (Souter, Gins21 7
burg, Scalia, and Stevens) said that the President lacks such authority.
Another four Justices (the plurality) concluded that the President could
detain an individual like Hamdi, but that he was entitled to a certain
amount of process-more than the government had been willing to provide-to challenge his enemy combatant designation. 218 Absent a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the courts do have a say in reviewing the detention of citizens.219
But Hamdi is hardly a sweeping vindication of civil rights, and
there are important limitations on its holding.220 First, on its facts, it ap208.
Id.
209.
Id. at 530 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
Id. at 533.
210.
211.
Id. at 537.
212.
Id. at 533-34
Id. at 537.
213.
214.
Id. at 535-36.
215.
Id. at 536.
216.
Id. at 521 (majority opinon), 541 (Souter J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment), 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217.
Id. at 540 (Souter J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment), 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218.
Id. at 519-20, 526 (majority opinion).
219.
Id. at 526.
220.
For critical commentary of Hamdi, see Chemerinsky, supra note 192, at 73, 80 (noting
that in Hamdi "the Supreme Court emphatically upheld the rule of law and the right of those being
detained as part of the war on terrorism to have access to the courts" but that the government also
scored a "significant victor[y]"); Frederic Block, Civil Liberties During NationalEmergencies: the
InteractionsBetween the Three Branches of Government in Coping with Past and Current Threats to
the Nation 's Security, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 459, 523 (2005) ("While preserving the
basic concept of judicial review.., the plurality accorded far-reaching deference ... to the Execu-
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plies only to citizens detained within the territorial jurisdiction of a
United States court.22 1 In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted that the constitutional requirements may differ for a citizen who is captured abroad and
held outside the United States, 22 and Hamdi did not address that issue.
Moreover, at present, it is unclear if non-citizens detained as enemy
combatants are entitled to the same due process rights as citizens, even if
held within the territorial jurisdiction of a federal court. In Rasul v.
Bush,223 decided the same day as Hamdi, the Supreme Court held that
non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are entitled to file habeas claims in federal court.224 The Court stressed the special status of
Guantanamo Bay; it was "territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.2 2 5 The question now being litigated in federal court in the District of Columbia is whether non-citizen
detainees at Guantanamo Bay are protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.22 6 Two district courts in the District of Columbia
have reached opposite conclusions.2 27
Beyond its limitations, however, in important respects Hamdi represents a victory for the executive branch. The Supreme Court accepted
the President's authority to detain a citizen combatant captured on a foreign battlefield.228 The detention could be indefinite without a criminal
trial, subject only to the principle that detention last no longer than active
hostilities. 229 A citizen-detainee who wished to challenge his designation

tive Branch."); Brooks, supra note 6, at 701 (noting that the Supreme Court has left open the possibility that "Hamdi might be entitled only to a sort of 'due process lite."'); David D. Coron & Jenny
S. Martinez, eds., InternationalDecision: Availability of U.S. Courts to Review Decision to Hold
US. Citizens as Enemy Combatants - Executive Power in War on Terror, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 782,
785 (2004) (calling Hamdi "a sharp and much needed rebuke to the U.S. government's position" but
critical of the Court's "ambiguous mingling of domestic and international law"); Daniel Moeckli,
The US. Supreme Court's 'Enemy Combatant' Decisions: A 'Major Victory for the Rule of Law'?,
10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L., Spring, 2005, at 75, 76 ("The suggestion that the court has inflicted
a decisive defeat on the government that will forever change the legal parameters of the 'war on
terror' is, however, misleading."); John K. Setear, A Forest with No Trees. The Supreme Court and
InternationalLaw in the 2003 Term, 91 VA. L. REV. 579, 585 (2005) ("No Justice saw Hamdi as
raising an issue of international law that the Court needed to resolve."); Jared Perkins, Note and
Comment, Habeas Corpus in the War Against Terrorism: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Citizen Enemy
Combatants, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 437, 456-57 (2005) (critiquing Hamdi for not going far enough to

ensure separation of powers).
221.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 577 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. Id.
223.
224.

542 U.S. 466 (2004).
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 481.

225.
Id.at 476.
226.
See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 452 (D.D.C. 2005), appeal
docketed, No. 05-8003 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 10, 2005); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 320 (D.D.C.
2005), appealdocketed sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, No. 05-5062 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 10, 2005).
227.
See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 281; Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at
323. Both cases are on appeal to the D.C. Circuit.
228. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
229. Id. at 520.
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as an enemy combatant was given basic, but limited, process, and there
was fairly deferential judicial review of that designation.230
Other cases are being litigated that may provide additional guidance
on the separation of powers issues raised by the government's detention
of enemy combatants.2 3' In particular, the case of Jose Padilla raises
issues similar to those of Hamdi, with the exception that Padilla, unlike
Hamdi, was not captured on a distant battlefield, but on U.S. soil as he
stepped off an airplane. 232 Much like Hamdi, the government has made
broad claims of executive power to detain even citizens as enemy combatants.233 And much like Hamdi, the courts have struggled to resolve
the issues. The district court denied Padilla's habeas petition and accepted the government's claim that the President has the authority to
detain citizens captured on U.S. soil as enemy combatants in a time of
war; 234 the Second Circuit reversed. 235 The Supreme Court reversed the
Second Circuit on jurisdictional grounds, holding that under the habeas
statute the case was improperly filed against the Secretary of Defense in
the Southern District of New York.236 Padilla's claim was dismissed
without prejudice.237
Padilla then filed his habeas petition in the District of South Carolina, where a district court granted the petition. 238 First, the court held
that the AUMF did not authorize Padilla's detention and that detention
was contrary to the requirements of the Non-Detention Act, which "forbids any kind of detention of an United States citizen, except that which
is specifically allowed by Congress., 239 The critical distinction between
this case and Hamdi was that Padilla was not captured on a distant battlefield, but in the United States. 240 No language in the AUMF explicitly or
implicitly gave the President the authority to hold Padilla as an
enemy
24 1
combatant or that overcame the terms of the Non-Detention Act.

230.
See David B. Rivkin & Lee A. Casey, Bush's Good Day in Court, WASH. POST, Aug. 4,
2004, at A19. (arguing that Hamdi was a victory for the government); Chemerinksy, supra note 192,
at 80 (calling Hamdi "significant" victory for the government).
231.
AI-Marri v. Hanfit raises the issue of whether a non-citizen may be detained as an enemy
combatant, when he is captured on U.S. soil. AI-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673 (D.S.C. 2005).
AI-Marri was initially arrested in Peoria, Illinois, and charged with various federal crimes. AlMarri, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 674. A month before his scheduled trial date, the government designated
him an enemy combatant and transferred him to military custody. Id. A district court recently
upheld AI-Marri's detention as an enemy combatant. Id.at 675.
232.
Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699 (2dCir. 2003).
233.
Padilla,352 F.3d at 711.
234.
Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
235. Padilla,352 F.3d at 695.
236. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
237. Id. at 451.
238.
Padilla v. Hanfl, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005).
239. Padilla,389 F. Supp. 2d at 688-89.
240. Id.at 688.
241.
Id.
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Second, the court rejected the assertion that the President had the
inherent authority to detain Padilla as an enemy combatant.2 42 Citing
Youngstown, the court held that the President had taken steps inconsistent with the will of Congress. 243 Thus, the President's authority was at
its lowest ebb. "'Congress, not the Executive, should control utilization
of the war power as an instrument of domestic policy.' 244 To accept the
President's claim of inherent authority "would not only offend the rule of
law and violate this country's constitutional tradition, but it would also
be a betrayal of this Nation's commitment to the separation 245
of powers
that safeguards our democratic values and individual liberties."
A theme throughout the district court's opinion was its concern that
the executive have the power to order the indefinite and unreviewable
detention by the military of a citizen arrested on U.S. soil. 24 6 In the absence of, and indeed contrary to, congressional authorization, the President was handling through military means a situation that could be handled through the courts. "Simply stated, this is a law enforcement matter, not a military matter., 247 Criminal laws also allowed for the prosecution and punishment of terrorists. Unlike the President's claim of inherent authority, however, the criminal process allowed for accountability
and helped prevent arbitrary government action.248
On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court.249
The Fourth Circuit held that just as the AUMF authorized Hamdi's detention, it authorized Padilla's detention as well. There was "no difference in principle between Hamdi and Padilla. 2 ' 0 The locus of capture
was irrelevant, as was the availability of criminal prosecution.25 1 According to the Fourth Circuit, the district court had been insufficiently
deferential to the President's determination that detention was necessary
and appropriate in the interest of national security.252

242.

Id. at 689.

243.

Id.

244.

Id. at 690 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).

245.
246.
247.

Id.
Id.
Id.

248.

Id. at 691.

249.
250.
251.

Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
Padilla,423 F.3d at 391.
Id.at 393-95.

252.

Id. at 395. The United States recently indicted Padilla on criminal charges and moved to

transfer him to civilian custody. Neil A. Lewis, Terror Trial Hits Obstacles, Unexpectedly, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, A30. The Fourth Circuit has requested briefing on whether it should vacate its

opinion in the case. Id.If the Fourth Circuit opinion stands, absent a change of views, it is likely
that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari and reverse the Fourth Circuit. In Padilla,542 U.S. at

465, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissented from the dismissal
of the habeas petition on jurisdictional grounds. On the merits, the dissent argued "that the Non-

Detention Act ...prohibits - and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution ...
does not authorize - the protracted, incommunicado detention of American citizens arrested in the
United States." Id. at 464 n.8.

If those Justices hold fast, the fifth vote would come from Justice

Scalia based on his view that the Executive cannot detain a citizen as an enemy combatant unless the
writ of habeas corpus has been suspended. Handi, 542 U.S. at 553. The swing vote may be Justice
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Thus, some markers have begun to emerge with respect to the executive's power to detain citizens as enemy combatants. The Court has
rejected the broadest assertion of unreviewable executive prerogative to
detain enemy combatants.25 3 It is clear that the courts can review a detention as long as the detainee is being held in an area subject to the jurisdiction of a federal court.254 It is also clear that the executive must
produce evidence, however modest, to establish the basis for the enemy
combatant designation. 5 5 In analyzing claims of executive authority,
courts will explicitly or implicitly rely upon Justice Jackson's analytical
framework to determine if the President is acting with congressional authorization, in the absence of congressional authorization, or contrary to
congressional authorization. 256 Perhaps yet another theme to emerge
from the litigation is that the further events of September 11, 2001 recede
without an additional major terrorist attack on the United States, the easier it may be for courts to reject far reaching claims of executive
author257
ity without apparent fear of compromising national security.
Yet many difficult questions remain, some of which are currently
being litigated in federal court, often times with disparate results. Noncitizens held in a territory subject to the jurisdiction of federal court can
seek habeas review of their detention. But, do they have cognizable constitutional rights? As for citizens, what is the scope of their rights if they
are captured and detained overseas? If an individual is acquitted in federal court on terrorism-related charges, can the President simply move to
detain the individual militarily as an enemy combatant in spite of the
acquittal? In the absence of the AUMF, what is the extent of the President's Article II power to detain individuals as enemy combatants? If
Congress explicitly overrides the provisions of the Non-Detention Act
and gives the President the authority to militarily detain alleged terrorists, both citizens and non-citizens alike wherever they are found, would
such a measure-a national security detention act-be upheld?
The upshot of this may ultimately be to expand, not contract, the parameters of executive power. From this perspective, the President asked
Breyer, as he joined the dissent in Padillaand the plurality in Hamdi. Perhaps, then, the critical
distinction for Justice Breyer may be that Padilla was arrested in the United States, and not on a
distant battlefield.
253.
Id. at 553.
254. Id. at 693.
255.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.
256. Padilla,389 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
257. Justice Davis expressed a similar sentiment in Ex parte Milligan, when he stated:
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not allow that calmness in
deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial question. Then, considerations of safety were mingled with the exercise of power; and feelings and interests prevailed which are happily terminated. Now that the public safety is
assured, this question, as well as others, can be discussed and decided without passion or
the admixture of any element not required to form a legal judgment.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 109 (1866) (emphasis added). See also REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 222 ("A
court may also decide an issue in favor of the government during a war, when it would not have
done so had the decision come after the war was over.").
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for a yard, and ended up with a foot or two. More than that, however, the
President shifted the parameters of the debate so that there is no longer
any question that, as long as the AUMF applies, the President can detain
a citizen captured abroad as an enemy combatant.2 58 The government
may also be able to proceed against the citizen detainee in a properly
constituted military tribunal, where it may rely upon hearsay evidence
and a rebuttable presumption in favor of its evidence.259
Most important, characterizing terrorism as a military issue, rather
than a law enforcement problem, has the inexorable consequence of expanding the scope of executive discretion, unfettered from the judicial
oversight inherent in the criminal justice system and the need to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For reasons grounded in separation of
powers and institutional competency, 260 courts are apt to be more deferential to the President when he acts as Commander-in-Chief, than when
he acts as a prosecutor.
Legitimizing a military response to terrorism will inevitably increase the military's role at home, especially when the United States is
viewed as part of the battleground in the war on terror. Indeed, this has
already begun to happen. The Department of Defense has created an
Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and a Northern Command
dedicated to homeland defense and civil support. 261 "When directed by
the President, the Department will execute land-based military operations
to detect, deter, and defeat foreign terrorist attack within the United
States. 262 It has also announced its plan to develop "a cadre" of specialized terrorism intelligence analysts and to deploy them to interagency
258.
Chemerinsky, supra note 192, at 80 ("The Court ruled in Hamdi that American citizens
apprehended in foreign countries can be detained as enemy combatants.").
259.
Id. at 78.
260.
See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) ("[Plolicies in regard to the
conduct of foreign relations [and] the war power ... are so exclusively entrusted to the political
branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference."). See also
Justice Jackson's opinion in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.:
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not be published
to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should
review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held
secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive confidences. But
even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to
foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They
are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be
undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance
or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
261.
STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, supra note 171, at 7-8; Kohn, supra note 12, at
176; Bradley Graham, War Plans Drafted To Counter Terror Attacks in U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 8,
2005, at AI (noting the Pentagon has drawn up classified plans for responding to terrorist attacks in
the United States).
262.
STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, supra note 171, at 26.
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centers for homeland defense and counterterrorism. 263 As a policy matter, in certain circumstances, the military should provide support to civil
authorities, by, for example, sharing intelligence that may help prevent a
terrorist attack, responding to an on-going attack, or offering assistance
in the aftermath of an attack, especially one that is catastrophic.
Nevertheless, there is a tension here: an undue military involvement in domestic matters flies in the face of American tradition. The
Framers had a general mistrust of military power permanently at the
President's disposal. 264 As Justice Scalia noted in Hamdi:
In the Founders' view, the "blessings of liberty" were threatened by
"those military establishments which must gradually poison its very
fountain." No fewer than 10 issues of the Federalist were devoted in
whole or in part to allaying fears of oppression from the proposed
265
Constitution's authorization of standing armies in peacetime.
266

The Constitution reflects the Framers' concerns. 2 6 The President 2 is
67
the Commander-in-Chief, but Congress has the power to declare war
and "[t]o make Rules for the . . . Regulation of the land and naval
Forces. 268 Congress also has the power "[t]o raise and support Armies,
but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term
than two Years. 2 69 More than the constitutional checks, there is a general statutory prohibition on military involvement in domestic law enforcement. Despite important exceptions, the Posse Comitatus Act
armed forces as "a posse comitatus or othermakes it a crime to use the
270
wise to execute the laws.
Domestic military involvement in the war on terror raises serious
concerns. Some have argued that military resources will be depleted and
the military's effectiveness in fighting overseas impaired.27 1 Others

263.
id. at 21.
264.
See Hamdi,542 U.S. at 568-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
265.
Id. at 569 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 285 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
266.
Id.
267.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
Id.at cl. 14.
268.
269. Id. at cl. 12.
270.
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1385 (West 2000). "[S]everal statutory
exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act, especially the Insurrection statutes, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 331-335
(West 1998), give the President wide latitude to use troops for almost any purpose, including law
enforcement, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack." STEPHEN DYcus ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW 781 (3d ed. 2002). For an overview of the exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act, see also
Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffgin for Posse Comitatus, 12 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 116 (2003) ("Especially since the end of World War II, the dramatic growth of
federal powers, and the extensive delegation of legislative authority to the President, has resulted in
a series of significant exceptions to the [Act]"); Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus
Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 383, 398 (2003) (arguing
that "over the last 30 years, the protections offered by the [Posse Comitatus Act] have been significantly eroded.").
271.
See Kealy, supra note 270, at 430; Kohn, supra note 12, at 177.
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voice civil liberties concerns.27 2 There are important cultural differences
between the military and civilian law enforcement. A soldier, unlike a
peace officer, is not trained in the requirements of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.2 73 Due process is a concept that has little relevance on the

battlefield. The concern is that "mission creep" will result in which the
military becomes adjuncts of internal security agencies including law
enforcement, prosecutors, and domestic intelligence, that had been entirely civilian in nature.2 74 "This has happened before--during almost
every war since the mid-19th century, with harm to American civil liberthe relationship between the armed forces and the American
ties and 2to
75
people.

Thus, as the executive continues to blur the line between a military
and law enforcement response to terrorism, difficult line drawing issues
will undoubtedly continue to emerge in which the courts will be asked to
determine the bounds of executive authority. Of necessity, such a determination will raise questions that go to the heart of separation of powers,
including an assessment of executive power and the limits on it in time
of war. In a sense, then, Hamdi and Padillamay be a harbinger of things
to come, as the courts struggle to reconcile conflicts between the demands of national security and civil liberty.
B. Centralizationof IntelligenceFunctions

Beyond a shift from the criminal justice system to a military response to terrorism, a second paradigm shift has occurred as well: the
centralization of intelligence functions, both civilian and military, within
a single bureaucratic structure in the executive branch. This centralization does not pose a conventional separation of powers issue, because,
with the exception of the CIA, which is statutorily designated an inde272. See Canestaro, supra note 270, at 100 ("The founding fathers feared the involvement of
the Army in the nation's affairs for good reason. History has demonstrated that employing soldiers
to enforce the law is inherently dangerous to the rights of people."); Kealy, supra note 270, at 430
(arguing that post-9/1 "[c]ongress should resist any call for greater domestic involvement of the
military," because "[s]uch operations have too great a capacity to lead to civil rights violations,
disproportionate uses of force, a depletion of military resources, and the militarization of the police."); Kohn, supra note 12, at 177:
The danger posed by the use of the regular military forces internally is dual: on the one
hand, impairing military effectiveness in the primary task of the regulars today, warfighting overseas; and on the other hand, undermining civil liberty (as has happened in
past wars) by using regular troops for law enforcement, to try or incarcerate American
citizens, to gather intelligence, or to suppress dissent or antiwar protest.
273. See Judge Arnold's opinion in Bissonette v. Haig:
Civilian rule is basic to our system of government. The use of military forces to seize civilians can expose civilian government to the threat of military rule and the suspension of
constitutional liberties. On a lesser scale, military enforcement of the civil law leaves the
protection of vital Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in the hands of persons who are
not trained to uphold these rights. It may also chill the exercise of fundamental rights,
such as the rights to speak freely and to vote, and create the atmosphere of fear and hostility which exists in territories occupied by enemy forces.
776 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1985); Canestaro, supranote 270, at 140-41.
274. Kohn, supra note 12, at 188.
275.
Id.
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pendent agency, the other fourteen agencies that comprise the intelligence community have always been situated within the executive branch.
Moreover, the centralization has occurred not by presidential fiat, but by
legislative enactment followed by executive implementation.
This unprecedented centralization lowers the wall that has separated
external and internal security or foreign and domestic intelligence for
more than half a century. 76 Other laws passed in the wake of 9/11, particularly the Patriot Act, further this centralization by fostering closer
cooperation between the foreign and domestic intelligence gathering
agencies.2 77 In the long run, this may help prevent a future catastrophic
terrorist attack on U.S. soil; certainly, that was the intent of the 9/11
Commission, which recommended the creation of a National Intelligence
Directorate, as well as the hope of Congress, which enacted the recommendation into law in December 2004.278 It is important to recognize,
however, that this measure may have costs as well: much like the military response to terrorism, the centralization of intelligence functions will
enhance the authority of the executive branch and increase the potential
for an abuse of power.
In the aftermath of World War II, the architects of our national security apparatus sought intentionally to diffuse power among different
intelligence agencies by creating a wall within the executive branch between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement. The National
Security Act of 1947, which chartered the CIA, specifically provided that
the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or
internal security functions., 279 The CIA, in other words, was intended to
combat the foreign enemies of the United States, not its domestic wrongdoers. 280 That task fell upon the FBI, as well as other federal law enforcement agencies, which had statutory police powers and an internal
security function, even with respect to counter-espionage investigations.
276.
For purposes of this article, "the wall" is used in a broad sense to refer to more than the
restrictions on sharing information gathered under the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act, but to
the historical separation of the CIA and FBI, and their respective functions. See Eleanor Hill's Joint
Inquiry Staff Statement:
The walls in question include those that separated foreign activities from domestic activities, foreign intelligence operations from law enforcement operations, the FBI from the
CIA, communications intelligence from other types of intelligence, Intelligence Community agencies from other federal agencies, classified national security information
from other forms of evidentiary information, and information derived from electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence or criminal purpose from those who are not directly
involved in its collection.
Joint Inquiry Staff Statement: Hearing on the Intelligence Community's Response to Past Terrorist
Attacks Against the United Statesfrom February 1993 to September 2001, 22 (Oct. 8, 2002) (statement of Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff) [hereinafter Joint Inquiry Staff Statement],
http://intelligence.senate.gov/0210hrg/
021008/hill.pdf.
277. See id. at 26
278. 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West 2005).
279. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3(d)(1) (West 2005).
280. Baker, supra note 154, at 36.
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The legislative history of the National Security Act of 1947 shows
that one overriding concern was to avoid giving the CIA too much

power.2 8' Part of the objection was based on protecting bureaucratic turf,
particularly on the part of J. Edgar Hoover's FBI.282 Yet the framers of
the Act did not want the CIA to become a centralized national security

apparatus with control over both foreign and domestic intelligence func283

tions.
Truman emphasized that "this country wanted no Gestapo under
any guise or for any reason. ' '284 Stuart Baker, former General Counsel to
the NSA, has explained that "American intelligence agencies were
shaped by individuals who understood the mechanics of totalitarianism
and wanted none of it here. They knew that the Gestapo and Soviet
KGB had in common a sweeping authority to conduct internal and external security and intelligence gathering. 285 Richard Posner notes that
"democratic nations, including the United States... , have shied away
from placing the same official in charge of both foreign and domestic
intelligence, lest the rough methods used by intelligence services on for-

eigners in foreign, often hostile countries be turned on its citizens. 2 86 In
effect, notwithstanding any potential costs to efficiency, the 1947 Act
established a decentralized intelligence apparatus with a separation of
powers between the CIA and FBI.
The separation between foreign intelligence or external security and
law enforcement or internal security was maintained for more than half a
century after the CIA's creation. During the Cold War, intelligence agencies faced a threat that was almost entirely foreign; law enforcement
dealt with problems that were largely domestic.2 87 With the exception of
counterespionage matters, there was little overlap between the work of
the intelligence agencies and law enforcement.28 8 When such overlap
occurred, it was often on an ad hoc basis in specific cases. In limited
instances, personnel from one agency were detailed to the other. For
281.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supranote 105, at 82.
282.
Id. ("Lobbying by the FBI, combined with fears of creating a U.S. Gestapo, led to the
FBI's being assigned responsibility for internal security functions and counterespionage."); Joint
Inquiry Staff Statement, supra note 276, at 22 ("Two fundamental considerations shaped [the National Security Act of 1947]: that the United States not enable a Gestapo-like organization that
coupled foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence functions; and that the domestic organization
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation be preserved."); ZEGART, supra note 101, at 163-84 (describing political maneuvering that led to creation of CIA).
283.
1 CHURCH FINAL REP., supra note 53, at 136 n.31 ("It was frequently remarked that the
[Central Intelligence] Agency was not to be permitted to act as a domestic police or 'Gestapo."');
COLL, supra note 128, at 254-55 ("[In the aftermath of a catastrophic war against Nazism, Congress also sought to protect the American people from the rise of anything like Hitler's Gestapo, a
secret force that combined spying and police methods.").
284.
HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1MEMOIRS: YEAR OF DECISIONS 117(1955). Truman repeats that he
was "very much against building up a Gestapo." Id.at 253. For Truman's recollections on the
intelligence reorganization following World War 1I,
see HARRY S. TRUMAN, 2 MEMOIRS: YEARS OF
TRIAL AND HOPE 73-79 (1956).

285.
Baker, supra note 154, at 36. Baker most recently served as General Counsel to the
WMD Commission. WMD COMM'N REP., supranote 105, at 597-98.
286.
POSNER, supra note 6, at 65.
287.
Baker, supra note 154, at 37; STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, supra note 171, at 23.
288.
Baker, supra note 154, at 37.
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example, in the mid-1980's, the Director of Central Intelligence created a
Counterterrorist Center within the CIA that included representatives from
the FBI and other agencies.2 9
The segregation of spies and cops began to change with the demise
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Intelligence resources
were used on other foreign targets, including international drug trafficking and organized crime, terrorists, and alien smuggling. 290 Those targets had both an international and a domestic element; they could also be
viewed as presenting a challenge to both national security and to law
enforcement. At the same time, globalization allowed terrorists and
other foreign wrongdoers to travel, gather and exchange information,
communicate, network, and transfer funds more easily.2 9 1 From a laptop
computer thousands of miles from the United States, a wrongdoer could
send an e-mail to followers around the world with instructions on launching an attack within the U.S. or on U.S. interests overseas. The potential
for overlap between foreign intelligence investigation and domestic law
th
enforcement is particularly high in counterterrorism matters. 292 In the
1990's, the intelligence community and domestic law enforcement began
to collaborate more often. Cooperation was institutionalized. Senior FBI
and CIA officials met regularly to plan joint operations, exchange personnel and technology, and coordinate activities on sensitive investigations.2 93
Nevertheless, pre-9/11 the intelligence community remained decentralized. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was the Director of
the CIA as well as the head of the U.S. intelligence community. Despite
an impressive title, the DCI had limited authority over the intelligence
community. The DCI stated the community's priorities and coordinated
development of its budget, but lacked line authority over the heads of
other agencies, as well as the power to shift or allocate resources within
the community.294

289.

9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 85.

290.

Baker, supranote 154, at 37.

291.

Bassiouni, supra note 145, at 87-88. See also 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 88

("The emergence of the World Wide Web has given terrorists a much easier means of acquiring
information and exercising command and control over their operations."); Steve Coil & Susan B.
Glasser, Jihadists Turn the Web Into Base of Operations, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2005, at AI ("the

'global jihad movement,' sometimes led by al Qaeda fugitives but increasingly made up of diverse
'groups and ad hoe cells,' has become a 'Web-directed' phenomenon").
292.

DYCUS ET AL., supra note 270, at 688. See also STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE,

supra note 166, at 23 ("[T]ransnational terrorists have blurred the traditional distinction between
national security and international law enforcement."); Chesney, supranote 12, at 2 (asking whether
terrorists are "criminals who should be incapacitated through the civilian law enforcement process"
or "enemy belligerents engaged in war crimes who should be incapacitated through military detention, even when operating within the United States"); Harris, supra note 13, at 554 ("it is conventional wisdom that previous distinctions between 'foreign' and 'domestic' are archaic and counterproductive when addressing modem national security threats.").
293.

Benjamin Wittes, Blurring the Line Between Cops and Spies, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 9,

1996, at 1.
294. 9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 79-80, 372.
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To remedy the failure to "connect the dots" that led to 9/11, the 9/11
Commission recommended the creation of a powerful Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who would oversee and coordinate the efforts
of the intelligence community, both foreign and domestic. 95 Based on
that recommendation, Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).296 This Act has several important features: (1) it creates a Senate-confirmed DNI, popularly known
as the "intelligence czar," who is the head of the intelligence community
and principal adviser to the President on intelligence matters related to
national security 297 (2) gives the DNI budgetary authority over the intelligence community; 298 (3) allows the DNI to exercise authority over the
hiring of key officials in the intelligence community, including the Director of the CIA and the Director of the NSA;2 99 and (4) empowers the
DNI to establish personnel policies for the intelligence community. 0 0
For the first time, the foreign and domestic intelligence communities are
united under the direction of an official who has actual authority over
them.
More changes, however, were to follow that consolidated the DNI's
authority over the FBI. On March 31, 2005, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD Commission) issued its report.30 1 The WMD Commission issued seventy-four recommendations to strengthen U.S. intelligence capabilities. 30 2 Among other things, the Commission noted that
the DNI's authority over the FBI was "troublingly vague., 30 3 In response
to the WMD Commission's recommendations, on June 29, 2005, President Bush clarified and centralized the DNI's authority over the FBI's
intelligence program. 304 The President ordered the creation of a National
Security Service within the FBI that combines the FBI's counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence elements.30 5 The DNI has authority to approve the hiring of the head of the National Security Service,

295.

Id. at373-74.

296. IRTPA, supra note 9. See generally SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004 (2004),

http://www.senate.gov/-govt-aff/_files/ConferenceReportSummary.doc; POSNER, supra note 6, at
62-69.
297. IRTPA, supra note 9, at § 1011(a), 118 Stat. 3643-44.
298. Id. at § 1011(c) & (d), 118 Stat. 3644-47.
299. Id.at § 1014, 118 Stat. 3663-64.
300. Id.at § 101 I(f), 118 Stat. 3648-50.
301. WMD COMM'N REP., supranote 105.
302. Id.
303. Id.at 457.
304. Memorandum from George W. Bush to Vice President, Sec'y of State, Sec'y of Def.,
Attorney Gen., Sec'y of Homeland Sec., Dir. of OMB, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Assistant to the
President for Nat'l Sec. Affairs, and Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism
(June 29, 2005)
[hereinafter
Memorandum
from
George
W.
Bush],
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/print/20050629-1.html. See also Dan Eggen &
Walter Pincus, Bush Approves Spy Agency Changes, WASH. POST, June 30, 2005, at AI; Douglas
Jehl, Bush to Create New Unit in F.B.I.for Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2005, at Al.

305.

Memorandum from George W. Bush, supra note 304.
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who will report to both the Director of the FBI and to the DNI. 3 °6 Moreover, the DNI was given authority over the FBI's three billion dollar
intelligence budget.3 °7
In and of itself, the creation of the DNI would be a significant step
in lowering the wall between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement. The provisions of IRTPA, however, cannot be viewed in
isolation. Congress has passed other laws, most notably in the Patriot
Act, that further dismantled the wall.3 °8 Several provisions of the Patriot
Act make it easier for foreign intelligence to be used for domestic law
enforcement purposes.
This occurs, for example, in the area of electronic surveillance. To
obtain a domestic wiretap for criminal investigations, a federal agent
must meet the requirements of Title 111.309 A judge must find probable
cause to believe that "an individual is committing, has committed, or is
about to commit" an enumerated predicate offense and that "particular
communications concerning such offense will be obtained through...
interception."3 10 Thus, the essential inquiry focuses on the conduct of the
target of the surveillance and whether the surveillance will uncover evidence of crime.
In contrast, under the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act (FISA),
to obtain an order for electronic surveillance or for a physical search, the
agent must establish probable cause that the target of the surveillance is a
"foreign power" or the "agent of a foreign power." 31 1 "Foreign power" is
defined to include, among other things, "a group engaged in international
terrorism.''312 "Agent of a foreign power" includes "any person who...
knowingly engages in... international terrorism... for or on behalf of a
foreign power., 313 When the target of surveillance is a citizen or resident

306. Id.
307.
Id.; Eggen & Pincus, supra note 304.
308.
This, too, has resulted in a profusion of scholarship. See generally SCHULHOFER, supra
note 13, at 43-48 (critique of Patriot Act amendments to FISA based on civil liberty concerns);
Sullivan, supra note 13, at 133-43 (same). A debate has also emerged on the extent to which the
wall has been torn down. See Seamon & Gardner, supra note 13, at 321-22 (disagreeing with assertion that Patriot Act "tore down 'the wall"' and urging Congress to "truly tear down the wall");
Swire, supra note 13, at 1308 ("The Patriot Act made significant changes to FISA, notably by tearing down the 'wall' that had largely separated foreign intelligence activities from the usual prosecution of domestic crimes."); Breglio, supra note 13, at 196 ("The wall has been torn down."); Harris,
supranote 13, at 554 ("The law enforcement prohibition in the National Security Act may make part
of the destruction of 'the wall' somewhat theoretical, despite the expansion of coordination and
information sharing between the FBI and CIA."). The key point is that the Patriot Act makes it
easier for the government to use foreign intelligence for domestic law enforcement purposes. General Michael V. Hayden, until recently the head of the NSA and now the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, has noted that "[m]ore information is flowing between NSA and law enforcement
agencies." Hayden, supra note 109, at 259.
309.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2518 (West 2005).
18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(3)(a)-(b) (West 2005).
310.
50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (West 2005).
311.
Id. § 1801(a)(4).
312.
313.
Id. § 1801(b)(2)(C).

2005]

EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE WAR ON TERROR

377

alien, "agent of a foreign power" generally requires criminal activity.314
The inquiry under FISA focuses on a target's status as a "foreign power"

or "agent of a foreign power," and there need not be probable cause to
believe that the surveillance will uncover evidence of crime.3

5

FISA

surveillance, then, does not require a showing that comports with the
traditional criminal standard of probable cause.316

There are other significant advantages to the government in obtaining a FISA order, instead of one under Title III. One advantage is duration. Surveillance of foreign agents under FISA may last ninety days for
U.S. persons; 3 17 surveillance under Title III is limited to thirty. 318 Extensions of surveillance are also easier to obtain under FISA, than under
Title I1. 3 19 Another advantage is secrecy. Under Title III, the govern-

ment must provide notice to the target of the surveillance "[w]ithin a
reasonable time"; 320 under FISA, no notice is necessary unless evidence

derived from the surveillance is used in a criminal prosecution.3 21 Title
III also requires the government "to minimize the interception of com322
munications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter.,
In general, minimization must occur contemporaneously with the surveillance.323 Under FISA, "in practice... surveillance devices are normally
left on continuously, and the minimization occurs in the process of indexing and logging the pertinent communications. 32 4
To avoid the misuse of FISA surveillance or searches, and to prevent agents from obtaining a FISA order when they would be unable to
obtain a warrant under Title III, prior to the Patriot Act, FISA required
314. Id. § 1801(b)(2); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 738 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002); Lee &
Schwartz, supra note 113, at 1459 ("[lt should be noted that FISA's definition of an 'agent of foreign power' who is a United States person requires criminal acts"). But see Varghese, supra note 13,
at 421 (arguing that FISA investigations are not necessarily grounded in criminal activity).
315.

SCHULHOFER, supra note 13, at 38.

316. See In re Sealed Case:
[W]hile Title III contains some protections that are not in FISA, in many significant respects the two statutes are equivalent, and in some, FISA contains additional protections.
Still, to the extent the two statutes diverge in constitutionally relevant areas - in particular, in their probable cause and particularity showings - a FISA order may not be a 'warrant' contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.
310 F.3d at 741; Baker, supra note 154, at 42 (noting that FISA surveillance "saves [law enforcement officials] much of the hassle of meeting Title III standards for the wiretap."); Schulhofer, supra
note 169, at 79 ("FISA surveillance is permitted after showing only a diluted form of suspicion not
equivalent to the traditional criminal standard of probable cause."); Sullivan, supra note 13, at 136
("Crucially, FISA warrants do not require a showing of probable cause of criminal activity.").
317. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(e)(1) (West 2005).
318.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(5).
319.

SCHULHOFER, supra note 13, at 44.

320.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(8)(d).
321.
See also Varghese, supra note 13, at 411 (comparing powers granted through FISA and
Title III). Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(8)(d) with 50 U.S.C.A. § 1806(c) & 50 U.S.C.A. § 1825(b).
For a comparison of the differences between FISA and Title III, see the lower court opinion in In re
All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 616-17
(FISA Ct. 2002), as well as the appellate decision that reversed it. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at
737-41.
322.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(5).
323. Id.
324. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 740.
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that "the purpose" of the order be to obtain foreign intelligence information.325 Courts, in turn, construed "the purpose" test to require the government to establish that "the primary purpose" was to obtain foreign
intelligence information, and not to further a domestic criminal investigation.326 This issue arose in criminal cases in which the government
sought to introduce evidence at trial that had been collected pursuant to a
FISA order.
The Patriot Act relaxed the rules separating foreign intelligence investigations from criminal investigations, based on concern that the rules
had become overly restrictive. 327 One amendment to FISA, for example,
provides that the collection of foreign intelligence need only be "a significant" purpose, and not "the purpose" of the investigation. 328 As a
result, the "primary purpose" test has been legislatively set aside. 329 The
"significant purpose" test is not difficult to meet. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review has concluded that the government's
"sole objective" cannot be to gather evidence for prosecution purposes.33 °
Thus, the government may use FISA surveillance when its primary, but
not exclusive, purpose is to gather evidence to prosecute a foreign intelligence crime or ordinary crime "inextricably intertwined" with foreign
of
intelligence crime, "[s]o long as . . . [it] entertains a realistic option
33 1
prosecution.',
criminal
through
than
other
agent
the
dealing with
Similarly, the Patriot Act facilitates the two-way flow of information between the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The
Act makes clear that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... foreign intelligence
or counterintelligence ... information obtained as part of a criminal
investigation... [may] be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement,
intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national
security official in order to assist the official332receiving that information in the performance of his official duties.
Grand jury information, which ordinarily must be kept confidential,
may be shared by criminal investigators with other government officials
for counterterrorism purposes.333 Information gathered under Title III
may also be shared "to the extent that such contents include foreign intel325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. at 723.
Id. at 725-27 (describing origin of "primary purpose" test).
Jeffrey Rosen, Security Check, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 2002, at 11.
Patriot Act, supra note 11, at § 218, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (West

2005).
329.
See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736.
Id. at 735.
330.
Id. at 735-36.
331.
The Homeland Security Act broadened the disclosures to state, local, and foreign govern332.
ment officials. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 897, 50 U.S.C.A. 403-5d(l) (West 2005).
Patriot Act, supra note 11, at § 203(a)(1). The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven333.
tion Act of 2004 also allows federal authorities to share grand jury information about terrorist threats
with state, local, tribal, and foreign government officials. IRTPA, supra note 9, at § 6501.
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ligence or counterintelligence., 334 Similarly, officials who collect foreign intelligence information are allowed "to consult with Federal law
enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect
against ... sabotage or international
terrorism by a foreign power or an
335
agent of a foreign power.,
The centralization of intelligence functions through the creation of
the DNI, as well as the dismantling of the wall between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement, does not appear to raise a constitutional objection on separation of powers grounds. Under Justice Jackson's analysis, the President's action would be afforded the greatest degree of deference; when he appoints a DNI under IRTPA or implements
the provisions of the Patriot Act, he acts with the constitutional authority
of Congress as well as his own.336 The President's authority, then, would
be at its zenith, "supported by the strongest of presumptions and the wid' 337
est latitude of judicial interpretation.
Policy arguments can be made for and against the centralization of
intelligence functions. On the one hand, there are persuasive arguments
in favor of dismantling the wall between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement. First, with respect to international terrorism directed at the U.S., the distinction between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement is largely illusory,3 38 and the law should take
into account that reality. Second, as the 9/11 Commission noted, "The
importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be overstated.
Without it, it is not possible to 'connect the dots.' No one component
holds all the relevant information., 339 In other words, information should
be shared if it will help prevent a terrorist attack. Pre-Patriot Act, the
wall blocked the exchange of information between the intelligence community and law enforcement. 340 Worse yet, the pre-9/1 1 rules were
complex, often misinterpreted, and applied in an overly restrictive manner. 341 Indeed, a misunderstanding of the rules hindered the FBI's at-

334.

Patriot Act, supra note 11, at § 203(b)(1).

335.
Id. § 504(a)-(b).
336.
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
337. Id. at 637. Kathleen Sullivan notes that "the Constitution may require separation of powers, but within the executive branch it is a voluntary decision to separate knowledge among the FBI,
INS, and CIA." Sullivan, supra note 13, at 142. Richard Posner suggests that a separation of powers issue could arise if the President tries to resist the centralization required by IRTPA. POSNER,
supra note 6, at 61-62.
338. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 726 (citing United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964
(9th Cir. 1988) with approval, which noted that under FISA "'[i]ntemational terrorism,' by defmition, requires the investigation of activities that constitute crimes."); Harris, supra note 13, at 54950, 554 (arguing that "the fight against terrorism blurs the border between law enforcement and
intelligence," a "strict bifurcation between law enforcement and intelligence activities ... no longer
exists," and "the foreign/domestic divide is oftentimes a distinction without a difference in the fight
against terrorism and other transboundary threats.").
339.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 408.
340.
Id. at 79.
341.
Id. at 79-80; In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 722-28 (criticizing development of "primary
purpose" test under pre-Patriot Act FISA).
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tempt to locate one of the participants in the 9/11 plot. 342 As a policy
matter, the executive branch ought to be able to use the information it
has, however collected, to prevent terrorist attacks. This is especially so
given the magnitude of the threat.
Moreover, one can argue that IRTPA and the Patriot Act include
structural checks that will help prevent civil rights abuses. IRTPA provides that the DNI is not located within the Executive Office of the President.343 The Act creates a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
within the Executive Office of the President that is required to provide
advice and oversight on privacy and civil liberties concerns raised by
"the implementation of laws, regulations, and executive branch policies
related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism. ' ' 344 The DNI
must appoint a civil liberties protection officer.345 The DNI and the
DNI's Principal Deputy cannot both be active military officers.346
IRTPA also reiterates the mantra that the CIA is to have "no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions. 347
Similarly, under the Patriot Act, the CIA Director is to "have no authority to direct, manage, or undertake electronic surveillance or physical
search operations pursuant348to [FISA] unless otherwise authorized by
statute or executive order.,
On the other hand, there may be considerable costs associated with
centralizing intelligence functions. Some have questioned whether creating a DNI will prove to be effective. Richard Posner has argued forcefully that it will not. 349 But, more important, dismantling the wall that
342.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 269-71.
343.
IRTPA, supra note 9, at § 101 (a).
344.
Id. § 1061(c)(3). This Board is advisory and reports to the President. Martha Neil, Members of Privacy and Civil Liberties Board Named, 4 NO. 24 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 4 (2005). President
Bush appointed members to the panel in June 2005. Id. Richard Ben-Veniste, a member of the 9/11
Commission, has criticized it as "a very watered-down board without the kinds of powers which I
believe are necessary to provide credibility and authority, such as independent subpoena power...
and a bipartisan selection process." Caroline Drees, Civil Liberties Panel Is Off to a Sluggish Start,
WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2005, at A13.
345.
IRTPA, supra note 9, at § 101 l(a), 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3d(a)(1) (West 2005).
346.
Id. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3a(c)(1)-(2).
347.
Id. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-4a(d)(1).
348.
Patriot Act, supra note 11, at § 901. The Patriot Act also has a sunset provision. Id. §
224.
349. See POSNER, supra note 6. Among other things, Posner argues that the intelligence reform
may be inefficient and costly. First, the reform proposed a structural solution to a management
problem. Id. at 127. "A reorganization is a questionable response to a problem that is not a problem
of organization." Id. Second, reorganization imposes substantial transition costs, as the agencies in
the intelligence community adapt to the new management structure. This can lead to "transitioninduced dysfunction." Id. at 129. "[A]doption of the proposals was bound to usher in a protracted
period of increased vulnerability to attack by dislocating the intelligence system." Id. at 130. Third,
greater centralization of intelligence activities may result in diseconomies of scale. Id. at 141. Added
layers of bureaucracy may result in delay and prevent information from reaching key policymakers.
Id. "[C]entralizing intelligence ... given the sheer size of the U.S. intelligence system . . . overload[s] the top of the intelligence hierarchy." Id. at 150. Centralization may also stifle diversity of
views and competition among the intelligence agencies. Diversity or pluralism, unlike centralization, may result in "more and better information." Id. at 153-54. In sum, the intelligence reform
resulted in "a bureaucratic reorganization that is more likely to be a recipe for bureaucratic infighting, impacted communication, diminished performance, tangled lines of command, and lowered
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was erected so carefully almost 60 years ago may give rise to one of the
very problems that the framers of the 1947 National Security Act sought
to avoid: civil rights abuses caused by the excessive
concentration of
350
power within a centralized intelligence apparatus.
First, centralization creates a greater risk that intelligence will be
politicized to suit a President's agenda. 35' The decentralized system that
existed prior to IRTPA made it more difficult for the President to pressure or manipulate the entire intelligence community; the voice of the
CIA Director, for example, was one among many.352 Whatever its faults,
decentralization encouraged a diversity of views, competition in the
gathering and analysis of intelligence, and independent thinking. 353 As
an institutional matter, this may be particularly important for agencies
largely shielded from public scrutiny that serve top officials in the executive branch. Even without centralization, "[n]o other part of the government has so narrow an audience--or responds so enthusiastically to
guidance from above. 354 Centralization and the creation of a DNI who
oversees the intelligence community means that "the President will have
only one mind in the intelligence community to bend to his will. '355 This
is so, even if as a technical matter, the DNI is not located within Executive Office of the President.356 The reality is that the DNI is appointed by
the President and reports to the President.
Second, lowering the wall between foreign and domestic intelligence creates the risk that foreign intelligence and methods used to acquire foreign intelligence will be used for domestic law enforcement
purposes in an effort to circumvent legal safeguards that would otherwise
apply, even in cases unrelated to international terrorism. Baker observes
that "[i]ntelligence- gathering tolerates a degree of intrusiveness, harshness, and deceit that Americans do not want applied against themselves., 357 Very different legal regimes apply to government action with
morale than an improvement on the previous system." Id. at 207-08.

Worse yet, it may "induce

complacenc[y] about our 'reformed' intelligence system and by doing so deflect attention from
graver threats than a repetition of 9/11." Id. at 208. More fundamentally, Posner argues that "the
prevention of surprise attacks may pose problems that even the best intelligence system could not
overcome. Recognition of this fact is the beginning of realism in the redesign of the system." Id. at
204.
350.
For that reason, the American Civil Liberties Union opposed giving the Director of National Intelligence certain powers. See Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel, American Civil
Liberties Union, ACLU Analysis of the 9-11 Commission's Recommendations for Intelligence
Reform (July 30, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=16181&c=1 11; Civil Liberties and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, Before the House JudiciarySubcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism and HomelandSecurity, Aug. 23, 2004 (testimony of Gregory T. Nojeim, Associ-

ate
Director
&
Chief
Legislative
Counsel
http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID= 16280&c=206.
351.
352.

for

the

ACLU),

POSNER, supra note 6, at 116.
Id.

353. Id. at 7, 43. See id. at 84. See generally id. at 99-162 (discussing principles of intelligence and organization).
354. Baker, supra note 154, at 40.
355.
POSNER, supra note 6, at 116.
356.
50 U.S.C.A. § 403(a)(2) (West 2005).
357.
Baker, supra note 154, at 40.
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respect to internal or external security. As a matter of constitutional
criminal procedure, for example, the Fourth Amendment does not apply
to extraterritorial searches of non-resident aliens absent a substantial
connection between the alien and the United States.35 8 Nor are aliens
entitled to Fifth Amendment due process rights outside the sovereign
territory of the United States. 359 As previously noted, different statutory
regimes apply to electronic surveillance and physical searches that relate
to foreign intelligence or to domestic law enforcement. Prior to the Patriot Act, agents may have been tempted to use a FISA order or information derived from a FISA order when they were unable to meet the requirements of Title III. That temptation, however, was checked by the
"primary purpose" test then in place. 360 The new test--one that requires
only "a significant purpose" -will have the opposite effect. 36 1 It creates
an incentive to seek a FISA order instead of one under the more onerous
requirements of Title III. The information sharing provisions of the Patriot Act create a similar risk that an agent will be able to access information otherwise inaccessible under the laws that constrain domestic law
enforcement activity.
Third, there are important cultural differences between the worlds
of cops and spies, and they approach their work differently. According
to Admiral Stansfield Turner, a former Director of the CIA, "The FBI
agent's first reaction when given a job is, 'How do I do this within the
law?' The CIA agent's first reaction when given a job is, 'How do I ' do
362
this regardless of the law of the country in which I am operating?'
Similarly, Stewart Baker has noted that "[c]ombining domestic and foreign intelligence functions creates the possibility that domestic law enforcement will be infected by the secrecy, deception, and ruthlessness
that international espionage requires. 36 3 Or, as Richard Posner adds,
"The idea that the CIA would engage in domestic intelligence gives even
conservatives the creeps; yet the Intelligence Reform Act takes a step in
that direction by placing the Director of National Intelligence
over both
'364
the CIA and the domestic intelligence activity of the FBI.
This is not to impugn the integrity, idealism, or good faith of the
many dedicated members of the intelligence and law enforcement com6 Almost thirty years
munities. 365
ago, the Church Committee sought to
358.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990). See generally
FALLON, supra note 6, at 249 ("The Constitution affords few if any rights that extend outside the
territory of the United States to citizens of other countries.").
359.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784
(1950)).
360.
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 723.
361.
See id.
362.
Wittes, supra note 293, at 20.
363.
Baker, supra note 154, at 36-37.
364.
POSNER, supra note 6, at 57.
365.
See Baker, supra note 154, at 40 (noting "the depth of the ... [NSA's] commitment to
obeying the legal limits on gathering intelligence relating to American citizens."); Hayden, supra
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understand how officials in intelligence agencies had committed unlawful acts in the mistaken pursuit of the public good. Quoting Justice
Brandeis, the Committee observed:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evilminded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understand66
ing.

3

Furthermore, for institutional reasons, the executive branch and its
members may not be well situated to analyze any trade-off between civil
liberty and national security. The executive branch's foremost concern
will not necessarily be civil liberty; rather, it will be preservation of the
state itself. In Hamdi, Justice Souter explained:
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a
reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or
some condition in between) is not well entrusted to the Executive
Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to maintain
security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of
Government asked to counter serious threat is not the branch on
which to rest the Nation's entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory; the
responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that security legitimately raises. A reasonable balance is more likely to be
reached on the judgment of a different branch .... 367
From that perspective, it is possible to see how officials within the
executive branch may become the well meaning but misguided individunote 109, at 260 ("The process of reporting to legislative, executive, and judicial bodies has created a
culture at NSA that respects the law and the need to protect U.S. privacy rights.").
366.
1 CHURCH FINAL REP., supra note 53, at 2 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 479 (1928)).
367. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Douglas
made a similar point in Katz v. United States:
Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In matters where they believe national security may be involved they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral
as a court or magistrate must be. Under the separation of powers created by the Constitution, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and disinterested. Rather it
should vigorously investigate and prevent breaches of national security and prosecute
those who violate the pertinent federal laws. The President and Attorney General are
properly interested parties, cast in the role of adversary, in national security cases .... I
cannot agree that where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth
Amendment rights is assured when the President and Attorney General assume both the
position of adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate.
389 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 52-53:
[U]nder many circumstances the executive branch is most unlikely to strike the right balance between security and liberty. A primary task of the President is to keep the citizenry
safe, and any error on that count is likely to produce extremely high political sanctions.
For this reason, the President has a strong incentive to take precautions even if they are
excessive and even unconstitutional.
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als against whom Justice Brandeis once warned. Even pre-9/1 1, the CIA
and FBI were occasionally involved in serious violations of civil rights
and illegal activity. 368 Those violations occurred despite the diffusion of
power between them. The question that arises is whether the possibility
for such violations will increase now that the walls separating foreign
intelligence and domestic law enforcement have been dismantled and are
unlikely ever to be rebuilt. This may be especially so since neither the
threat of WMDs nor the "war on terror" is likely to end anytime soon.
Indeed, in Hamdi the government conceded that "'given its unconventional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal ceasefire agreement.' 369 In other litigation, the government has allowed that
"the war could last several generations." 370 According to the Department
of Defense, "the United States has become
37 a nation at war, a war whose
length and scope may be unprecedented., 1
Hamilton once warned that "[t]he violent destruction of life and
property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a
state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty
to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to
destroy their civil and political rights. 372 Will the intelligence reforms
of today give rise to the civil rights abuses of tomorrow? Are we witnessing the build up of a national security state that relies upon foundations laid during the Cold War? 373 As an institutional matter, great
power coupled with secrecy, little public accountability, limited or deferential judicial review, "dysfunctional" congressional oversight,37 4 and a
mandate to act for the imperatives of national security in a never ending
war on terror, would seem to create the preconditions for the next Church
Committee Report.
368. See generallySELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., FINAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND RIGHTS
OF AMERICANS, Book 11 (1976) (describing abuses committed by FBI and intelligence agencies);
MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., THE LAWLESS STATE: THE CRIMES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES (1976); Harris, supra note 13, at 540 (describing abuses committed by the CIA, some of
which "were committed at the direction of the highest levels of the nation's political leadership.");
Swire, supra note 13, at 1316-20 (listing abuses committed by FBI and intelligence agencies).
369. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520.
370. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
371.

STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, supra note 171, at 1.

372. THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 62 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
373. Professor Heymann, a former Deputy Attorney General in the Department of Justice, uses
the term "intelligence state" and warns of "drifting into an 'intelligence state."' HEYMANN, supra
note 6, at 133-57. Scholars have used the term "national security state" in the past to describe the
U.S. response to the Cold War. See HOGAN, supra note 93; DANIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE:
THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR (rev. & updated ed. 1990). General Hayden, the Deputy Director of
National Intelligence, has said that "the United States no longer ha[s] the luxury of maintaining
divisions between its foreign and domestic intelligence structures, because 'our enemy does not
recognize that distinction."' Jehl, supra note 304. Timothy Edgar, national security counsel for the
ACLU, has warned, "[s]pies and cops play different roles and operate under different rules for a
reason ....The FBI is effectively being taken over by a spymaster who reports directly to the White
House ....It's alarming that the same person who oversees foreign spying will now oversee domestic spying, too." Eggen & Pincus, supra note 304.
374.
9/11 COMM'N REP., supra note 105, at 420 (calling for improved congressional oversight).
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CONCLUSION

Post-9/1 1, the executive branch has made an aggressive assertion of
power, often with either congressional approval or acquiescence. The
government's response has reduced the distinction between external and
internal security. In part, this has occurred because of the nature of the
threat; international terrorism can be viewed as both a national security
and law enforcement problem. For policy reasons as well, no doubt the
President and Congress believed the measures they took were essential to
protect the United States.
This has resulted in two paradigm shifts. One has been the militarization of the response to terrorism and a concomitant de-emphasis on
criminal prosecution. The military's indefinite detention of citizens captured in the war on terror was a manifestation of that response. In
Hamdi, the Supreme Court held that the executive branch had gone too
far. The government's most extreme position-its claim to be able to
detain citizens indefinitely and unreviewably on grounds of military necessity-has been rejected. Many questions remain unanswered, however, and the case is not an unqualified vindication of civil rights. In the
meantime, despite traditional American concerns about military involvement in domestic affairs, the military will continue to play an ever
larger role in homeland security.
A second shift has been the centralization of intelligence functions
and a lowering of the wall that had historically separated foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement. This has occurred through the
creation of a Director of National Intelligence who oversees both foreign
and domestic intelligence collection and provisions of the Patriot Act that
make it easier for FISA orders to be used in connection with criminal
investigations and that facilitate the exchange of information between the
foreign intelligence community and domestic law enforcement. All of
this goes a long way toward creating a powerful, centralized intelligence
apparatus under the President's control with responsibility for both external and internal security.
Both paradigm shifts must be viewed in their historical context.
The power of the presidency has continued to grow in modem times.
Crisis only fuels the growth of that power. This is especially so when the
war on terror is all but endless and the threat involves weapons of mass
destruction. Moreover, power, by its nature, is not easily relinquished
once obtained, nor are rights, once lost, easily restored.375 Whatever the
375.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (opinion upholding military exclusion order creates a principle that "lies about like a loaded weapon ready
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need"); Ackerman, supranote 3, at 1030 ("Unless careful precautions are taken, emergency measures have a habit
of continuing well beyond their time of necessity."); Barak, supra note 1, at 149 ("I must take human
rights seriously during times of both peace and conflict. I must not make do with the mistaken belief
that, at the end of the conflict, I can turn back the clock."); Gross, supra note 3, at 1073 ("Emer-
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consequences of 9/11, the enlargement of executive authority is one of
them. 9/11, in that sense, represents a continuation and an acceleration
of a modem trend.
Perhaps this is as it should be; we live in troubled times.37 6 Chief
Justice Rehnquist poses the question of "whether occasional presidential
excesses and judicial restraint in wartime are desirable or undesirable. 3 77
The answer to that question, he writes as a legal realist, is "very largely
academic.,, 378 "There is no reason to think that future wartime presidents
will act differently from Lincoln, Wilson, or Roosevelt, or that future
Justices of the Supreme Court will decide questions differently from their
predecessors., 379 Nevertheless, as the lines blur between the military
and domestic law enforcement on the one hand and between domestic
law enforcement and foreign intelligence on the other, we find ourselves
in uncharted territory having set aside traditional concerns in pursuit of
the war on terror. As in Hamdi and Padilla,this blurring of lines will
undoubtedly lead to difficult questions regarding the limits of executive
prerogative. This article, then, sounds a cautionary note. In reviewing
post-9/1 1 governmental action, it is impossible not to be concerned with
the enlargement of executive power during the war on terror and its longterm potential effect on our constitutional structure.

gency regimes tend to perpetuate themselves, regardless of the intentions of those who originally
invoked them. Once brought to life, they are not so easily terminable."). But see Epstein et al.,
supra note 3, at 81, 95 (based on quantitative analysis of Supreme Court precedent, arguing that
"[c]ontrary to widespread fear and speculation that doctrine created during wartime 'lingers' on in
peace time, the rights jurisprudence appears to 'bounce back' during peacetime," but suggesting that
"as long as the war on terror continues in a severity comparable to previous wars, we should see a
sharp turn to the right in ordinary civil rights and liberties decisions of the Court."); Eric A. Posner
& Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REv. 605, 610 (2003) ("critiqu[ing]
accounts of emergency that posit a ratchet effect, in which a succession of emergencies produce a
unidirectional, and irreversible, increase in some legal or political variable.").
The last few years have witnessed a slew of terrorist attacks around the world. In October
376.
2002, nightclub bombings in Bali, Indonesia, killed 202 people. Cleric Convicted of Conspiring in
Bali Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at A5. That same month more than 100 hostages died in
a Moscow theater that had been seized by Chechen guerillas. Steven Lee Myers, Hostage Drama in
Moscow: Russia Responds; Putin Vows Huntfor Terror Cells Around the World, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 2002, at Al. In May 2003, suicide bombers killed 45 in Casablanca, Morocco. Whitlock, supra
note 153, at A10. In November 2003, bombs killed 57 and wounded more than 700 in Istanbul,
Turkey. Id. In March 2004, bombs set off in commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killed 191 and
wounded more than 1800. Id. In September 2004, 331 died, including 186 children, in Beslan,
Russia, after their school was seized by Chechen guerillas. C.J. Chivers, 11 Months Later, Russian
School Siege Claims New Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at A4. In October 2004, a series of
bombings killed 34 at or near the resort town of Taba, Egypt. Greg Myre & Mona El-Naggar,
Attacks in Egypt: Terrorism; Death Toll Rises in Egyptian Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, §
1, at 1. On July 23, 2005, three bombs in the Red Sea resort of Sharm El Sheik, Egypt, killed 64.
Greg Myre & Mona El-Naggar, It's Too Soon to Assign Responsibilityfor Bombings, Authorities in
Egypt Contend, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2005, at A9. Bombings have also occurred in London, England. On July 7, 2005, four suicide bombers killed 52 in London. Elaine Sciolino, Bombings in
London: Intelligence; Europe Confronts Changing Face of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2005, at
Al. Two weeks later, on July 21, 2005, there was a second attack in which the bombs did not explode. Id.
REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 224.
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